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Abstract 
In order to support the European Commission in the preparation of future initiatives fostering the 
sustainability of strategic supply chains, this study was commissioned to assess bottlenecks in the supply of 
materials needed for the development of technologies important to Europe’s defence and civil industries. The 
study focuses on five dual-use technology areas, namely advanced batteries, fuel cells, robotics, unmanned 
vehicles and additive manufacturing (3D printing). The technologies are preselected on the basis of a previous 
study (EASME, 2017) that explored the dual-use potential of key enabling technologies in which Europe should 
strategically invest. In addition, this report examines how these technologies could address specific military 
needs and their differences in relation to civil needs, and identified opportunities for future defence research 
areas that could potentially serve as a basis for the design of research initiatives to be funded under the 
future European Defence Fund. Moreover, potential opportunities for common policy actions are also 
identified, notably: to strengthen Europe’s position in the selected technologies’ supply chains; to facilitate 
collaboration between stakeholders; to increase industry involvement, with special emphasis on small and 
medium-sized enterprises; to improve existing legislation; and to increase synergies between civil and defence 
sectors to speed up progress in promising research areas. 
 
2 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to gratefully thank the contributing experts: Christophe-Alexandre Paillard (Ecole 
Militaire Strategic Research Institute, Ministry of Defence, France), Neil Adams (Innovation Bridge Consulting, 
United Kingdom), Karsten Pinkwart (University of Applied Science Karlsruhe, Germany), Alexander Andriotis 
(AVQ GmbH, Germany), Antidio Viguria (Advanced Aerospace Technologies (FADA-CATEC), Spain), Geert De 
Cubber (Royal Military Academy of Belgium — Unmanned Ground Vehicles Centre) and Alessandro Busachi 
(The Boston Consulting Group - BCG, Italy) for their comprehensive and useful contributions, feedback and 
critical review throughout the development of this report. 
The support and the contribution of many Joint Research Centre colleagues are also gratefully acknowledged. 
We are thankful to Alberto Pilenga, Beatriz Acosta Iborra, Colette Lambeau, David Pennington, Eveline 
Weidner, Fabrice Mathieux, Francesco Dolci, Jonathan Davies, Marek Bielewski, Natalia Lebedeva, Patricia 
Alves Dias, Pietro Moretto and Rafael Ortiz Cebolla for the insights, comments, data and information they 
have shared with us. 
We are also thankful to Ernest Cutuk (DG Research and Innovation), Milan Grohol (DG Internal Market, 
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs), Miguel Aguado Monsonet (DG Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs) and Thierry Buttin (DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs) for 
the review and comments provided. 
Last but not least, the authors are very grateful to Paul Anciaux (DG Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs) and Mathieu Moreau (DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs) 
for their reviews, continuous support and guidance throughout the preparation of this document. 
Authors 
Darina Blagoeva, Claudiu Pavel, Dominic Wittmer, Jaco Huisman, Francesco Pasimeni 
3 
1. Executive summary 
There has been growing concern throughout the EU in recent years about the security of supply of strategic 
raw and advanced materials that are critical for both civil and defence applications. The European defence 
action plan was launched to tackle such issues and to make the defence and security sectors more 
competitive and efficient via the European Defence Fund and other actions to support Member States with 
more efficient spending on joint defence. 
In order to support the European Commission in the preparation of future initiatives to foster the 
sustainability of strategic supply chains, a study was commissioned to assess bottlenecks in the supply of 
materials needed for the development of technologies that are important to Europe’s defence and civil 
industries. The report also identifies common dual-use research needs that would benefit from support from 
the European Defence Fund. 
This report focuses on five dual-use technology areas: advanced batteries, fuel cells, robotics, unmanned 
vehicles (UVs) and additive manufacturing (3D printing — 3DP). The technologies were preselected on the 
basis of a study (EASME, 2017) that explored the dual-use potential of key enabling technologies in which 
Europe should strategically invest. These technology areas were selected for their high relevance to the 
European defence technological and industrial base and their contribution to: 
— the strategic independence of the civilian and defence supply chains; 
— the economic impact on EU growth and job creation; 
— the EU’s knowledge base (impact on R & D capital stock). 
The five selected technology areas were thoroughly analysed with regard to their geopolitical supply chain 
dependencies, accompanied by a comprehensive overview of the corresponding key players (countries and 
companies). Other bottlenecks were also examined, such as the availability of a skilled work force, cost, 
quality issues, regulation, certification and legislation. Standardisation matters and intellectual property rights 
(IPR) issues have also been identified. 
The report also examined how these technologies could address specific military needs and how these differ 
from civil needs. In light of the above, the study identified opportunities for future defence research areas 
that could potentially serve as a basis for the design of research initiatives to be funded under the European 
Defence Fund. Potential opportunities for common policy actions were also identified, notably: to strengthen 
Europe’s position in the selected technologies’ supply chains; to facilitate collaboration between stakeholders; 
to increase industry involvement, with special emphasis on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); to 
improve current legislation; and to increase synergies between civil and defence sectors to speed up progress 
in promising research areas. 
A dedicated methodology, relying on several key parameters, was developed to identify forthcoming 
bottlenecks (supply risks) in the supply chains of the selected five technologies, from raw materials to final 
assemblies (e.g. lithium-ion (Li-ion) cells, fuel cells, robots, drones, 3D printers). Such parameters reflect the 
concentration of supply, the availability of domestic production in Europe, import reliance on specific raw 
materials, the use of critical raw materials (CRMs) in the technologies in question and the substitution and 
recycling potential of the raw materials required for these technologies. Potential bottlenecks are then 
visualised using a traffic-light colour matrix, in which red, yellow and green mean respectively supply issues 
of high, medium and low risk. 
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Key findings 
The technologies 
Advanced batteries: Li-ion 
Li-ion battery technology has improved recently, and has now become a real emerging technology across a 
wide range of civil and defence applications. Li-ion batteries offer improved power and energy performance 
compared to the currently used lead-acid batteries. Li-ion batteries are now used for portable applications 
such as tactical radios, thermal imagers and portable computing. In the next 5 years Li-ion batteries will 
further expand to heavy-duty platforms, such as military vehicles, boats, shelter applications, aircraft and 
missiles. Military land applications represent the largest fraction of the military battery market, followed by 
military naval ships and electric drone applications. While Li-ion batteries are crucial for defence applications, 
their development and future uptake are primarily driven by the civilian demand for portable electronic 
devices and, most recently, electric vehicles. 
 
Fuel cells 
Fuel cells are providing operational advantages to different mobile, stationary and portable defence 
applications as a power solution. Fuel cells require less maintenance and zero lubricants, increase endurance 
and ensure a high specific energy and power density beyond that which can be achieved using conventional 
battery power. In addition they have the potential to reduce sound and thermal signatures, which is an 
essential advantage for defence applications. The defence sector could gain noticeably from the unique 
features of fuel cells, which can provide tactical benefits to and increase the efficiency of the army. There is 
strong military interest in fuel cells as a means of reducing the logistics burden: fuel cells allow military 
forces to generate power in the operational theatre using local fuels or other sources, reducing the need to 
transport fuel with the associated high logistics costs and levels of risk. 
 
Robotics and exoskeletons 
Robotics is an emerging field of technology offering enormous potential for many civil and defence 
applications. Robots can perform military operations considered too risky, too complex or even impossible for 
humans. Military robots are autonomous or remote-controlled mobile robots designed for military 
applications, from transport, to search and rescue, to attack. Robots are used in the military on all three 
fronts — ground, water and sky — for rescue operations, disaster management, surveillance and security. 
Major tasks performed by robots include bomb disarmament, mine clearance, surveillance and help in search 
and rescue operations. Wearable robotics for the military is the most dynamic subset of the exoskeleton 
industry. Exoskeletons can be used by the army to support strength and endurance and protect soldiers from 
strain injury. 
 
Unmanned vehicles 
UVs are an evolving technology with enormous growth potential. The defence industry has recently witnessed 
growing application in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as in unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and 
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). The potential for market discontinuity is particularly evident for UAVs, 
as this branch is further developed in terms of market volumes than the UGV and UUV subsectors. 
UVs are expected to make significant changes to army, navy and air force operations in the 2021-2040 time 
frame up to the global scale. They will be crucial for mixed manned and unmanned arms operations. 
Increased load capabilities, in particular of UGVs and UAVs, will enable the soldier load to be reduced and will 
thus extend the soldier’s active area. UAVs in particular show the potential to provide key support in military 
operations such as remote sensing; reconnaissance; surveillance; target and decoy; the delivery of military 
cargo to and near combat zones, including lethal and non-lethal payloads; and armed attacks. Eventually, the 
application of UVs has the potential to reduce human exposure to hazards, reduce costs, extend application 
ranges and generally give commanders more options for action. 
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3D printing 
3DP is a new technology, which will disrupt the aerospace supply chain significantly by eliminating multiple 
manufacturing stages. It allows for reduction, substitution, recycling and mitigation in the use of CRMs and 
traditionally manufactured components. This is particularly relevant to defence in resource-constraint 
situations and/or remote locations in order to keep aerospace platforms operational. Currently, the use of 3DP 
in the defence sector is both very promising and merely anecdotal. The sector is not yet thoroughly 
incorporating 3DP, and thus is not yet exploiting the full technical potential offered by reducing weight and 
creating stronger and more efficient components. 
Raw materials supply risks 
Access to raw materials, and in particular to CRMs, is of great importance for the successful and smooth 
deployment of established and emerging technologies in Europe. This applies in particular to the five 
investigated technologies, which show massive growth potential. Several factors play a role when defining the 
risk of supply disruptions for Europe. One factor is the limited production of raw materials in Europe. Another 
factor is the high geographic concentration of the supply for some materials. The supply of certain strategic 
materials is dominated by only a few countries, several of which have politically instable governments. These 
factors, coupled with a rapid increase in demand, are risk factors for a potential supply shortage. 
The study confirmed the supposition that Europe currently produces only a small proportion of the raw 
materials required overall for Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, drones and 3DP technologies. The study has 
revealed Europe’s extremely high dependence on the supply of raw materials for all five technologies, 
supplying between 2 % of the raw materials (for Li-ion) and 5 % (for fuel cells). China dominates global 
production of the raw materials required for these five technologies, supplying between 22 % and 32 % 
across the five technologies. Other key suppliers of raw materials are South Africa, Russia and Brazil for all 
five technologies except Li-ion batteries, for which Australia and Chile are the major suppliers after China. 
Critical raw materials supply risks 
As regards the supply of CRMs for the five technologies, drones require the most at 23 CRMs, followed by 
robotics (19 CRMs), fuel cells (11 CRMs), 3DP (8 CRMs) and Li-ion batteries (5 CRMs). Europe provides only 
1 % of the CRMs required for its research and industrial needs. The major supplier of CRMs is China, with a 
share of almost 40 %, followed by South Africa, Russia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Brazil. 
China is the major supplier of 13 of the 23 CRMs, namely Sb, Bi, F, Ga, In, Mg, C, P, rare earth elements (REEs), 
Sc, Si, W and V. Around 40 % of the CRMs are provided by many small suppliers, with a < 1 % production 
share. Altogether, Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, UVs and additive manufacturing rely on 23 CRMs (1). The 
most used critical material in all five selected technologies is cobalt. The demand for cobalt is expected to rise 
sharply, especially with the market launch of electromobility, which may create supply shortages. Another 
bottleneck or supply risk is linked to the geopolitical stability of the main producing country. Currently, 54 % of 
cobalt mine production comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a country experiencing situations 
of violence and political instability. An additional bottleneck for cobalt is the refining stage: the majority is 
refined in China. China is also the major producer of magnesium, natural graphite, silicon metal and vanadium 
(CRMs used in four of the five technologies). Most of the other critical materials are used in three of the five 
technologies. 
The CRMs used in the selected technologies are listed below. 
— Li-ion batteries. Cobalt, fluorspar, natural graphite, phosphorus and silicon metal. 
— Fuel cells and hydrogen-related technologies. Boron, cobalt, magnesium, natural graphite, 
palladium, platinum, REEs, rhodium, ruthenium, silicon metal, vanadium. 
— Robotics. Antimony, bismuth, gallium, indium, tantalum and tungsten, in addition to the CRMs 
required in Li-ion batteries and fuel cells. 
                                           
(1) Platinum group metals (PGMs) are considered to be separate materials, while REEs were considered as a single material in the 
assessment. 
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— Unmanned (aerial) vehicles. Beryllium, niobium, hafnium and scandium, in addition to the CRMs 
needed in robotics. 
— 3DP. Cobalt, hafnium, magnesium, niobium, scandium, silicon metal, tungsten and vanadium. Of the 
non-critical materials, titanium is particularly relevant to metal-based 3DP for aerospace. 
Processed materials supply risks 
By the term ‘processed materials’ we mean manufactured materials such as composites, ceramics, steels and 
special alloys, along with advanced materials such as nanomaterials, graphene and carbon nanotubes. With 
the exception of Li-ion batteries, Europe is a strong supplier, globally, of the processed materials required for 
the five selected technologies. In general, Europe produces around 30 % of the processed materials required 
for Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, drones and 3DP technologies. 
Although a strong player in the field of processed materials production, Europe is highly dependent on the 
supply of some specific materials such as aramid fibre and semiconductors (main supplier United States; used 
in robotics and UAVs); ferroniobium (main supplier Brazil; used in UAVs and 3DP) and processed materials for 
Li-ion batteries (main supplier China). Such dependencies apply to both the civil and the defence sectors. To a 
lesser degree, Europe also relies on the supply of nanomaterials, specific Al alloys and speciality steels. 
The key suppliers of processed materials resulting from the analysis are: 
— China, Japan and South Korea for Li-ion batteries; 
— United States, China and Japan for fuel cells; 
— United States, China and India for robotics and drones; 
— United States, Canada and Japan for 3DP. 
The United States is a major supplier of the processed materials used in fuel cells, robotics and drones such 
as fibres (carbon and Kevlar), semiconductors, polymers, yttria-stabilised zirconia, nanomaterials and carbon 
nanotubes. Japan is among the key suppliers of processed materials for Li-ion batteries (nickel cobalt 
aluminium (NCA) cathode material) and is an important supplier of carbon fibre composites (CFCs), used in 
robotics and drones. China is a key supplier of processed materials for Li-ion batteries and is an important 
supplier of Mg and Ni-Ti alloys, along with magnetic alloys/powders for robotics and drones. South Korea is an 
important supplier of semiconductors and cathode and anode materials for Li-ion batteries. India is an 
important supplier of the steels and special alloys (Al, Ni, Ni-Ti) required in robotics and drones, while Canada 
is an important supplier of processed materials for fuel cells. 
Europe is relatively strong in processing capacities of materials for 3DP, with 40 % to 60 % of the suppliers of 
Ti alloys, Al/Mg alloys, Ni alloys, stainless steel alloys and special alloys being located in Europe. With only a 
small number of metal (aluminium and titanium) powder suppliers identified globally so far, the supply risk 
for metal-based 3DP for aerospace is still evaluated as high. Europe also appears to have a gap in the supply 
chain of all metal wire products. The analysis identified only two main suppliers with headquarters located in 
Europe. Most of the suppliers (at least 10) are located in China, and two suppliers in the United States. This 
may cause a significant lack of customisation capabilities between processed materials and the specific 3DP 
technologies that have been developed. 
Specific processed materials for military applications are those used in low-signature (low observable) 
applications. However, country production shares for such materials could not be assessed due to a lack of 
data. 
Components supply risks 
By the term ‘components’ (2) we mean finished parts ready to be used in certain applications, such as 
cathodes for batteries or fuel cells, motors and gears for robots and sensors for drones. With the exception of 
                                           
(2) Components step for 3DP was not considered (explanation given in the 3DP chapter). 
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fuel cell technology, Europe is home to a relatively low rate of domestic production of components. A key 
issue for batteries is the lack of EU capacity in Li-ion cell component manufacturing (cathodes, anodes, 
electrolytes and separators) and in cell manufacturing itself, for each of which there is a high level of 
dependence on China. Although the European share of the production of Li-ion cells is expected to increase — 
following the European strategic action plan on batteries adopted in 2018 — Li-ion batteries for common 
military applications are still assembled from commercial cells manufactured in Asia. China is also a major 
supplier (80 %) of the REE magnets used in robots and drones for both civil and defence applications. 
A high level of dependency is also observed in robotics and UAVs: one of the main concerns of the EU industry 
is the lack of EU component manufacturers, with the United States leading the supply of actuators, controllers 
(processors), graphics processing units (GPUs) and inertial measurement units (IMUs), while Japan dominates 
the supply of high-precision gears. The key suppliers of components shown in the analysis are: 
— China, Japan and South Korea for Li-ion batteries; 
— North America, Japan and Europe for fuel cells; 
— United States, China and Japan for robotics and drones. 
Overall, Europe produces around 12 % of the components required for Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, 
drones and 3DP technologies. More specifically, Europe produces around 8 % of the components for Li-ion 
batteries, 25 % for fuel cells, 4 % for robotics and 13 % for drones. It can be assumed that such 
dependencies are basically valid for both civil and defence applications. 
Assembly supply risks 
By the term ‘assembly’ we mean finished products such as Li-ion cells, fuel cells, robots, drones and 3DP 
systems. Overall, Europe produces around 0.2 % of Li-ion batteries, 1 % of fuel cells, 41 % of robots, 9 % of 
UAVs and 34 % of 3D metal systems globally. 
Europe is still a strong player in the production of robots (mainly service but also industrial) and 3D metal 
systems. Europe provides around 40 % of robots and supplies 34 % of additive manufacturing metal systems 
globally. However such leadership is being strongly challenged by China for both technologies; the picture may 
change drastically in the coming years — by 2025 — reflecting the ambitious ‘Made in China 2025’ initiative. 
Europe has some production of drones, though certainly not enough to satisfy its needs. Europe is very weak 
in the supply of Li-batteries and fuel cells, which are predominantly provided by Asia (China, Japan and South 
Korea) and North America (United States and Canada). 
Japanese manufacturers dominate industrial robotics, while US manufacturers dominate non-industrial 
robotics (e.g. surgical, defence and rescue), UVs and artificial intelligence. China dominates the manufacture 
of UAVs for civil purposes. The United States is the key player in military drones, along with military UGVs and 
UUVs, of which Europe is the second-biggest producer. Europe leads the exoskeleton market (based on the 
number of companies producing exoskeletons), followed by the United States, Japan, Canada and several 
other countries. The main use of exoskeletons is currently in the medical sector for rehabilitation purposes. 
Defence represents only 8 % of the exoskeleton market, in which US companies are the key players. 
Requirements for military exoskeletons are more stringent than for their civil counterparts: they need more 
strength and less weight, in addition to smaller, optimised power units allowing troops to be more 
independent. As the use of fibres (Kevlar and carbon) is critical for military exoskeletons, Europe faces a high 
level of dependence on the United States for the supply of such materials. 
Regarding 3D printers for industrial use, the United States leads in polymer-based technologies, with Europe 
strongly present in metal additive manufacturing (AM), which is more relevant to aerospace. On the basis of 
total units sold, Europe has about 20 % of the market share and the United States and Israel represent over 
71 % of supply. Europe’s share in the number of suppliers is 25 % and 21 % respectively for the two key sub-
technologies: powder bed fusion (PBF) and directed energy deposition (DED). China has a high and fast-
growing number of individual suppliers, albeit with a relatively low number of unit shipments so far. For 
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aerospace applications, the United States and the EU are equally present in the top 15 system integrators 
such as Airbus and Boeing, driving the development of 3DP on a large scale in their own way, in their 
respective supply chains. 
Policy recommendations 
This report stresses the importance of utilising the synergies between the civil and defence sectors in order to 
increase interest in common, dual-use research and investment opportunities. For some technologies, such as 
Li-ion batteries and fuel cells, supporting such synergies is even more crucial where volumes for defence are 
small and Europe has a weak position globally. 
The analysis has shown that the weakest step in the supply chain, for the five technologies under the 
spotlight, is the supply of raw materials. Furthermore, the supply of assemblies appears to be very critical for 
three of the technologies, namely Li-ion batteries, fuel cells and drones. The supply of processed materials is 
shown to be critical for Li-ion batteries, though some supply risks are also detected for robotics and drones. 
At the components level, though some supply risks are detected for Li-ion batteries and drones, robotics 
seems to be the most vulnerable of the technologies (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Identified supply risks for Europe in the supply chains of Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, drones and 3D 
printing 
 
Source: JRC 
Europe should therefore introduce mitigation strategies throughout the whole supply chain as soon as 
possible. At the level of raw materials, such strategies could include supply diversification, increased 
recycling volumes and the substitution of critical materials, for example the substitution of cobalt and 
PGMs, needed in Li-ion batteries and fuel cells and relevant also for robotics and UVs. Cobalt is also one of 
the CRMs for 3DP technology. Recycling is of particular importance for Li-ion batteries as a feasible way to 
secure access to raw materials. The role of China as a key supplier in the supply chains examined here is 
noteworthy. China has acquired, and continues to expand its dominant position in the Li-ion battery and drone 
supply chains, and has ambitious plans in the fields of robotics, fuel cells and 3DP. 
In addition, stockpiling could be considered to secure access to raw materials in the event of a crisis. 
A dedicated study needs to be commissioned to evaluate and analyse in more depth the potential of 
stockpiling materials essential to the development of certain technologies, looking at the environmental and 
economic impact and taking into account the expected technological developments in the future. 
Tailored, competitive awards-based programmes could be initiated to encourage European companies, 
in particular small businesses, to engage in European defence R & D with the potential for commercialisation, 
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i.e. high technology readiness level. The European Defence Fund could notably fund collaborative cross-border 
defence R & D to increase its attractiveness and to encourage SMEs to get involved. Such programmes, with a 
primary focus on defence, would lead to the procurement and development of new industrial capabilities 
addressing raw and processed materials criticalities with additional civil potential. 
The report also calls for support to increase manufacturing opportunities in Europe by creating an 
attractive investment environment for European companies. 
Further key policy actions identified in the report include fostering international collaboration (e.g. for fuel 
cells); supporting standardisation activities (e.g. 3DP, fuel cells, robotics and drones); and promoting the 
cyber physical security of robotics systems (including UVs). 
 
Research needs relevant to defence applications 
Besides the dual-use research needs identified in this study, important defence-related research areas should 
also be explored as potential topics for future reserach. 
Li-ion batteries 
— Research on system management to address specific military requirements such as thermal 
management, electromagnetic compatibility and battery safety. 
— Research on Li-ion batteries with lithium iron phosphate as a cathode material and lithium 
titanate replacing the graphite in the anode to improve the specific energy (3) and reduce discharging 
and costs. Such battery types are of interest to the naval and land defence sectors, especially for 
military vehicle applications in relation to providing ‘silent-watch’ conditions. 
— Research on emerging advanced batteries such as lithium-sulfur (Li-S) and lithium-air (Li-
air), with high potential for military applications, as they are both characterised by a very high 
specific energy density. Li-air batteries represent an emerging and promising chemistry for soldier-
portable batteries and aviation. Li-S batteries also show great potential, especially for high-energy 
military applications, as they can offer a theoretical energy density more than five times that of Li-
ion batteries. Li-S batteries also have the advantage of not containing any environmentally harmful 
fluorine, but research on new manufacturing processes is needed to make this technology 
commercially viable and usable for the defence sector. 
Fuel cells 
For military purposes, operating fuel cell systems independently from a hydrogen infrastructure is 
an essential point. The hydrogen needs to be produced on-site. This aspect is especially important for 
mobile fuel cell applications, including defence applications. The most feasible way to produce hydrogen for 
military purposes is reforming of diesel fuel or kerosene, as both fuels are readily available in the armed 
forces and logistics are available for these types of fuel. However, logistic fuels contain some amount of 
sulfur, which is detrimental for fuel cells — it poisons the noble metal catalysts. Desulfurisation is therefore 
considered to be a very important step in fuel-processing technologies for military purposes. Consequently, 
the following research areas should be explored. 
— Development of systems that can operate on logistic fuels as well as fuel cell systems, 
capable of operating in harsh environmental conditions (e.g. Arctic or desert) and giving an 
advantage to the army. Fuel cells tolerating sulfur could greatly facilitate military operations. 
                                           
(3) The specific energy of a battery is defined as the battery capacity in weight (Wh/kg), or the energy that can be stored in 1 kg of 
active material. 
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— Research on portable on-site fuel reformers and desulfurisation methods applicable 
directly to logistic fuels. This includes innovative materials for on-site hydrogen purification — for 
example, materials based on noble metals such as silver, gold and palladium seem to be a promising 
solution for the desulfurisation of logistic fuels. 
— Development of reliable stack-sealing concepts (4), which could be more challenging for 
defence applications, especially mobile ones, due to more stringent requirements regarding vibrations 
and shock. 
— Fuel cells such as direct-methanol fuel cells (DMFCs) can save energy and reduce the operating costs 
associated with dependence on foreign oil. These fuel cells are relevant to defence applications when 
used in remote locations to ensure electric power for battery charging, auxiliary power for 
surveillance and regular power for communication equipment. Research actions aiming at 
replacing methanol with ethanol in DMFCs could be relevant due to the toxicity of 
methanol. 
Robotics and unmanned vehicles 
— Development of advanced, lightweight, high-strength, structural materials (e.g. based on Al, 
Mg, Ti-alloys, composites) for robotics (including exoskeletons) and large UAVs. 
— Development of innovative smart (5) and multifunctional materials (6) for special applications 
such as: multifunctional actuators (7) and artificial muscles (e.g. vanadium-based materials); 
electronic skin (8) (e.g. composites of soft materials with conductive fillers, polymer-based 
materials, which could also incorporate metallic (e.g. Ni) microparticles into a polymer network, 
flexible and porous graphene foams); materials, paints and textiles to mitigate and reduce 
signatures (e.g. foams, plastics, elastomers, low-emissivity paints, multispectral patterned textile 
netting); and materials for soft robotics (e.g. printed liquid metals, metallic glass, liquid silicone 
rubber). 
— Development of smaller, more powerful, high-speed and precision electronics for military 
applications: complex military systems require efficient power electronics. High-density power 
electronics with high efficiencies (> 90 %) are becoming a requirement for high-end mission-critical 
military platforms, including UAVs, for which size, weight and power are limited. Gallium nitride-
based radio-frequency components are beginning to populate military radio-frequency applications. 
— Energy storage is a major bottleneck for mobile robotics. The development of smaller and more 
efficient power/energy sources (batteries, fuel cells or other alternative sources) and electric 
motors specifically important for exoskeletons and UAVs is another challenge to be faced by robotics 
and UAVs. 
— Development of armour with high ballistic performance and increased blast and shrapnel 
protection (e.g. complex composite materials, steel-alloys, Ti-alloys etc.). 
— Cyber physical security of electronics systems (such as controllers) for military robotics 
applications, including UAVs: methods to protect military systems (and critical civil infrastructure) 
against cyber supply-chain attacks. 
                                           
(4) Each individual fuel cell needs to be securely sealed in order to be protected from the environment and neighbouring cells. Stack 
sealing is therefore decisive for the cell’s lifespan. Sealing materials should be reliable (resist thermal and mechanical shocks and 
vibrations), should not react with the other fuel cell components and also should not be expensive. 
(5) Smart materials are materials that can change their stiffness and shape, for example. 
(6) Multifunctional materials, integrating processes like sensing, movement, energy harvesting or energy storage (e.g. materials that 
can change over time to adapt or heal). Smart materials can be considered to be multifunctional materials that have the ability to 
react upon an external stimulus, thus simulating the behaviour of nature’s materials. 
(7) Actuators can be considered to be a robot’s muscles. 
(8) Electronic skin refers to flexible, stretchable and self-healing electronics that are able to mimic the functionalities of human or 
animal skin. 
11 
— Technology advancements to develop more autonomous, smaller, more economical and more 
efficient military UAVs. 
— Research on counter drone systems will secure the data link and support shielding for emissions 
security (e.g. silver plating). 
3D printing 
Targeted investment in 3DP R & D for defence will enhance capabilities related to mobility, sustainability, 
repair and maintenance. More investment is needed to keep up with the pace of development in the United 
States and China. The potential of 3DP for defence capabilities is crucial for the smooth operation of combat 
and peacekeeping missions. It is recommended that R & D focus specifically on the following. 
— The development of new sustainable materials and processes, and related characterisation in 
the field of multifunctional materials, multi-materials and materials with highly improved 
functionality for aerospace applications, special alloys used for defence and space purposes and 
incorporating such elements as niobium, hafnium/zirconium and scandium. 
— REACH (registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals) related issues to be 
further investigated to ensure safe handling and proper removal and recycling from powder beds (9).  
— The standardisation and certification of metal powders and wire recipes for AM, which 
would aid EU companies in particular, considering that EU companies, and SMEs in particular, are 
relatively well positioned to produce high-quality components. The preference of the aerospace 
industry itself is to have a stable and international standardisation process involving European and 
international bodies (AM-motion, 2018; DefenceIQ, 2016). With regard to the Chinese research and 
development pace, which is seemingly much faster than that of the EU, it is recommended that 
targeted research and innovation actions be funded in this technical domain. 
— An improved strategic assessment of the resilience of the military supply chains. The (future) 
supply chain of the critical sectors of aerospace and defence will inevitably rely more and more on 
3DP in the near future. This warrants a careful reconsideration of specific strategies to mitigate 
supply risk. As a supporting strategy, creating strategic stockpiles for the manufacturing of the 
main 3DP powders can be reconsidered (RPA, 2012). Here, the most relevant 3DP powders identified 
in the background report include titanium grade 2, grade 5 and grade 23, Al-10Si-Mg, Al07Si-0.6Mg, 
nickel alloys 316L and 625, stainless steel alloy 718; CoCr and possibly specific zirconium and 
niobium alloys. 
— The use of 3DP for the repair and maintenance of equipment used in operations at remote 
locations. 
— Address the current lack of customisation capabilities between the processed materials and 
the specific 3DP technology, as well as the availability of high-quality, environmentally friendly 
and cost-effective materials. 
— Comprehensive assessment of aspects related to sustainability, responsible sourcing, skills and 
workforce, IPR protection and digital security. 
Cross-cutting research topics identified in this study include the maintenance of a knowledge base and 
skilled workforce in Europe, including software development skills — a key enabler for the 
development of robotic and autonomous systems for both European military forces and civil applications. 
Sensors are another cross-cutting element, becoming ever more important; their development and the 
processing of their data should receive close attention.   
                                           
(9)  Nickel is restricted for certain uses related to skin contact. Cobalt, magnesium, niobium and tungsten are 
registered as well. In this case, their specific properties will likely lead to more demand rather than 
restricted use in the future. 
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Policy context 
Raw materials are crucial for the trade and competitiveness of EU industry, as highlighted in various policies 
such as the renewed industry policy strategy (COM(2017) 479 final), the raw material initiative 
(COM(2008) 699) and the circular economy action plan (COM(2015) 614). Secure and sustainable access to 
raw materials is vital for strategic value chains such as batteries, e-mobility, renewable energy and defence. 
Following communication COM(2013) 542 and the European defence action plan (COM(2016) 950), this report 
analyses raw materials supply risks for the value chains of five dual-use technologies considered both 
strategically important for resilience in the defence sectors and fundamental for competitiveness in relation 
to their civil use. 
Main findings 
This study identifies bottlenecks and supply risks linked to raw materials and processed materials needed for 
the development of key defence capabilities by Europe’s defence industry. The dependence of Europe on 
the supply of raw materials for the five analysed technologies is extremely high. Europe produces 
on average around 3 % of the overall raw materials required in Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, drones 
and 3DP technology. China dominates global production, supplying around one third of the raw materials. 
Other key suppliers are South Africa (7 %) and Russia (4 %). With regard to the supply of CRMs required 
in these five technologies, Europe provides only 1 % of them. The major supplier is China, with a share 
of almost 40 %, followed by South Africa (9 %) and Russia (6 %). 
With the exception of Li-ion batteries, in general Europe is an important supplier of processed 
materials for these technologies, providing on average about one third of the materials. Other key 
suppliers are United States (20 %), China (19 %) and Japan (8 %). Canada, India and South Korea are also key 
suppliers for 3DP, robotics and Li ion batteries. 
With regard to the supply of components, with the exception of fuel cell technology Europe has a relatively 
low level of domestic production of components. On average Europe produces around 12 % of the 
components required in Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics and drones. Most of the components are supplied 
by Asia (46 %) and North America (31 %). 
Europe is very weak with regard to the supply of Li-ion, LiPo batteries and fuel cells, which is 
predominantly covered by Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) and North America (United States 
and Canada). 
Europe is a major player in the production of robots. Japanese manufacturers dominate industrial 
robotics, while US manufacturers dominate non-industrial robotics, robotics for the military, UVs and artificial 
intelligence. Europe is the leader in the production of exoskeletons for medical and industrial purposes. Other 
key manufacturers are the United States and Japan. Manufacturers in the United States are also the key 
players for military exoskeletons. 
Europe has some drone production capability, though not enough to satisfy its needs. The United 
States and China dominate UAV assembly and manufacturing for civil applications. The United States is the 
leader in the production of UGVs and UMVs. Europe is the second-biggest manufacturer of UGVs and UMVs. 
Regarding 3D printers for industrial use, the United States leads in polymer-based technologies, 
with Europe strongly present in metal additive manufacturing. However, more R & D investment is 
needed to keep pace with the speed of development observed in the United States and China. 
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Key conclusions 
It is important for Europe to secure the supply throughout the whole supply chain for important emerging 
dual-use technologies such as Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics/exoskeletons, unmanned systems and 3DP 
technology. The analysis has shown that the weakest step in the supply chain for the five investigated 
technologies is the supply of raw materials. Furthermore, the supply of assemblies appears to be very 
critical for three of the technologies, namely Li-ion batteries, fuel cells and drones. The supply of processed 
materials is critical for Li-ion batteries, though some supply risks are detected for robotics and drones. At the 
components level, though some supply risks are detected for Li-ion batteries and drones, robotics seems to be 
the most vulnerable technology. 
The extremely high dependency of Europe on the supply of raw materials required for these 
technologies should be mitigated via various measures. China has the dominant position in the supply 
of raw materials, including CRMs used in the five technologies. The other two major suppliers are South Africa 
and Russia. Yet a large amount of the materials are provided by numerous small suppliers, which gives good 
perspectives for supply diversification. The same is also true for the supply of processed materials and 
components required in those dual-use technologies for which Europe has no or insufficient production. In 
addition, stockpiling could be another way to secure access to raw or processed materials and components 
in the event of a crisis. A comprehensive analysis is needed to evaluate the potential and the feasibility of 
stockpiling for each of the technologies in question. Securing sustainable access to the right quantity and 
quality of raw materials is also a key element for future responsible developments in EU industry. 
Tailored, competitive awards-based programmes could be initiated to encourage domestic small 
businesses to engage in European defence R & D with the potential for commercialisation, i.e. a high 
technology-readiness level. The European Defence Fund could fund collaborative cross-border defence 
research to increase its attractiveness and encourage SMEs to get involved. Such programmes, with a primary 
focus on defence, would lead to the procurement and development of new industrial capabilities with 
additional civil potential. 
The report also calls for the provision of support to increase manufacturing opportunities in Europe by 
creating an attractive investment environment for European companies. 
Further key policy actions identified in the report include fostering international collaboration (e.g. for 
fuel cells); supporting standardisation activities (e.g. 3DP, fuel cells, robotics and drones); and promoting 
the cyber physical security of robotics systems (including UVs). 
Cross-cutting research topics identified in this study include the maintenance of a knowledge 
base and a skilled workforce in Europe, including software development skills — a key enabler for 
the development of robotic and autonomous systems for both European military forces and civil applications. 
Sensors are another cross-cutting element that is becoming ever more important; their development and the 
processing of their data should receive close attention. 
Lastly, it is recommended that more outreaching, strategic and comprehensive discussions on the 
role and future competitiveness of these emerging technologies be organised, in particular on the 
aspects of material availability, sustainability, IPR protection, software development and digital security for 
key military and civil supply chains. 
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Related and future JRC work 
This study is a part of the JRC raw materials project, which aims at supporting various EU policies by building 
the knowledge base (e.g. data, indicators, analysis, models and methodologies) required to ensure a secure 
and sustainable supply of primary and secondary raw materials across a wide range of value chains and 
sectors. The study is a follow-up to the 2016 study Raw Materials in the European Defence Industry, which 
identified a list of raw materials that are important for European defence. The present study analyses in more 
detail the specific supply risks in the entire value chain for five key technologies, with a focus on the early 
stage of extraction and refining of raw materials, and processed materials available for manufacturing. 
The outcomes of this report support the further development of the EU’s knowledge base on raw materials 
and the JRC Raw Materials Information System. It also provides valuable insights into individual materials to 
update the list of CRMs to be published in 2020. Finally, the results feed into ongoing research on the supply 
of primary and secondary raw materials, supporting in particular the implementation of the strategic action 
plan on batteries (COM(2018) 293). 
Quick guide 
This document is a summary report of the JRC technical background report ‘Materials dependencies for dual-
use technologies relevant to Europe’s defence sector’, EUR 29889 EN, referenced here as MatDual (2019). 
A comprehensive analysis, all data and information sources used to perform the analysis can be found in the 
JRC background report. In this summary the main facts and findings for the five investigated technologies are 
briefly summarised. 
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2. Introduction 
Materials are important assets that contribute to the prosperity and power of nations. They are seen as 
powerful weapons in economic warfare. Ensuring a sustainable supply of materials is, therefore, of crucial 
importance for Europe. And when they are needed for defence applications, materials assume strategic 
importance. The supply of raw materials is, however, just one side of the coin. The processing of raw 
materials and their transformation into advanced industrial products, in the context of growing scarcity and 
an increasing world population, is equally important. The need to obtain more with less is even greater, 
considering the relatively low or even non-existent potential for recycling of some of the materials used in 
many modern products. The potential for material substitution is often weak and is limited in many fields, 
amplifying yet further the need to secure our supplies. The processing of raw materials must therefore 
become smarter and more effective, producing high-quality products with as little of the raw material as 
possible. Using advanced manufacturing methods such as additive manufacturing is just one way to deal with 
such a challenge. Applying innovative methods to achieve higher recovery rates during the recycling of 
products is another. Reuse and remanufacturing approaches, part of a circular economic policy, are mitigating 
measures that can further reduce the demand for primary materials. 
Various measures can be introduced to mitigate the supply risk, but they will not be sufficient to cope with 
rapidly increasing demand. The supply of primary raw materials will continue to be a key factor in the 
vulnerability of Europe and its deployment of emerging technologies. Europe is highly dependent on the 
supply of raw materials. Ensuring sustainable access to them is crucial for the processing and manufacturing 
industries, in both the civil sector and the defence sector. The present study aims to identify bottlenecks in the 
supply of materials needed for the development of several dual-use emerging technologies important to 
Europe’s defence and civil industries. The ultimate goals of the study are to: (1) identify possible opportunities 
for targeted policy actions to support the sustainable supply of such materials; (2) support DG Internal Market, 
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs in the preparation of future research programmes at EU level; and (3) 
raise awareness among companies, in particular SMEs, about possible supply-chain issues related to 
materials. 
Five emerging dual-use technologies have been selected for this study, namely: (1) batteries; (2) fuel cells and 
hydrogen storage; (3) robotics; (4) UVs; and (5) additive manufacturing (3DP). All five technologies are part of 
a wider list of technologies of high relevance to the European defence technological and industrial base in 
terms of strategic independence, economic impact, and knowledge and innovation. The list was established by 
a recent study (KET4Dual, 2017), where 38 technology areas were identified as innovation areas of common 
interest for both the civil sector and the military sector in which Europe should invest strategically. 
The five selected technologies are thoroughly examined with regard to pertinence to specific civil and defence 
applications, future demand trends, material requirements, supply of materials and key players in the supply 
chain, along with specific bottlenecks beyond material supply issues, including the necessity of a skilled 
workforce, know-how, regulation and legislation matters and the involvement of industry. There is a special 
focus on technology supply-chain issues, from raw materials to assembly, identifying key players at specific 
levels of the supply chain. Four supply-chain levels were chosen for the analysis, namely: level 1 — raw 
materials; level 2 — processed materials; level 3 — components; and level 4 — assemblies. The specificities of 
these five technologies with regard to defence applications are analysed, as military requirements are often 
more challenging than civil ones. 
A dedicated methodology, relying on several key parameters, has been developed to identify forthcoming 
bottlenecks in the supply chains of the selected five technologies, from raw materials to final assemblies (e.g. 
Li-ion cells, fuel cells, robots). Such parameters reflect the concentration of supply, the availability of 
domestic production in Europe, the import reliance on specific raw materials, the use of CRMs in the analysed 
technologies and the substitution and recycling potential of raw materials required in these technologies. The 
expected demand trends for each technology are also taken into consideration as a factor that could 
challenge the adequate, continued and sustainable supply of materials, components and assemblies. Potential 
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bottlenecks are then visualised using a traffic-light colour matrix in which red, yellow and green respectively 
mean a high, medium and low risk of supply issues. 
This study also provides an overview of ongoing research in Europe in relation to the selected five 
technologies. A dedicated patent analysis covering worldwide patent activities has also been carried out, 
following a methodology developed specifically for this analysis. A comparison between Europe and other 
leading countries has been made, and the top patenting companies listed for each technology. Details can be 
found in the related JRC technical background report (MatDual, 2019). 
Finally, opportunities for research activities and policy actions were proposed, based on the analysis described 
above. 
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3. Advanced (Li-ion) battery technology 
3.1. Applications of and demand for Li-ion batteries 
The chapter describes the importance to military users of advanced Li-ion batteries and 
intelligent battery-powered solutions, which can give operational advantages in various 
applications, from military land vehicles to anti-tank guided-missile systems or soldiers’ 
equipment. 
Traditional lead-acid batteries have been used by mechanised military forces since World War One, going 
through a major modernisation phase in the 1970s with the introduction of sealed lead-acid batteries. Lead-
acid batteries are still used in the majority of military land vehicles, and they are expected to remain in use in 
the immediate future since they are reliable and low cost. However, the low energy capabilities of lead-acid 
batteries, combined with their long charging times, has significantly restricted the silent-watch performance 
of military land vehicles. 
Today there is a strong need for intelligent battery-powered solutions to power modern defence 
applications such as wearable computers, night-vision systems, satellite communication systems, lasers, 
acoustics, magnetic and seismic sensors, drones, land missiles and other types of electronic equipment. 
Advanced military batteries must be secure and safe, with high operational quality and long-term 
security of supply, and must have the highest possible energy densities. 
Taking the example of batteries for military land vehicles, the report stresses the need for the latter to 
deliver high energy (requested for silent watch), to deliver high power levels for engine starting and 
load levelling and to withstand harsh environmental conditions. Batteries for military land vehicles 
need to be fast charged to minimise engine-on time during silent-watch operations, to reduce the 
noise of the vehicle and its heat signature, to lower the risk of detection and to reduce fuel 
consumption. Insufficient electrical energy storage can also inhibit the operational performance of military 
land vehicles. 
Against this backdrop, Li-ion battery technology has improved recently, and has now become a real emerging 
technology across a wide range of civil and defence applications. Li-ion batteries offer improved power 
and energy performance compared to the currently used lead-acid batteries. Over the last decade, 
Li-ion batteries have being used in the defence sector for portable man applications such as tactical 
radios, thermal imagers and portable computing. In the next 5 years, Li-ion batteries will further expand to 
heavy-duty platforms, such as military vehicles, boats, shelter applications, aircraft and missiles. Military land 
applications represent the largest fraction of the military battery market, followed by military naval ships and 
electric-drone applications. Although defence applications currently represent less than 1 % of the 
total Li-ion battery demand, the demand for batteries in these three defence applications is 
expected to increase about fourfold between 2018 and 2028 (IDTechEx, 2018). While Li-ion batteries 
are crucial for defence applications, their development and future uptake are primarily driven by the civilian 
demand for portable electronic devices and, most recently, electric vehicles. 
3.2. Technological challenges for Li-ion batteries 
The developments in the field of lithium batteries are very dynamic, and essentially driven by civilian 
applications, which can be a challenge for the military. If a battery type is not of interest to the civil sector, its 
adoption by the defence sector will be strongly challenged. Two recent promising technologies that can 
meet the specific military requirements for mobile applications (land vehicles) are lithium iron 
phosphate and lithium titanate batteries (Sims and Crase, 2017). They can offer greater energy capabilities 
and are able to be charged quickly. Other benefits of these batteries can be seen in their compatible voltage 
window, especially in case of lithium titanate, allowing them to immediately replace lead-acid batteries, and 
their improved safety properties, thus reducing the risk of catching fire when damaged. However, the higher 
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upfront cost of lithium iron phosphate compared to lead-acid batteries remains a challenge to their wider 
adoption. 
Lithium metal oxide batteries use various different metals, such as nickel, cobalt, aluminium and manganese. 
Lithium metal represents the best alternative to the graphite anode, able to produce a higher energy density 
compared to the Li-ion batteries used currently. However, lithium metal is still an immature technology, and 
many issues still need to be addressed, such as dendrite growth, instability of lithium metal, low coulombic 
efficiency, poor life cycle and safety, and the high flammability of the liquid electrolyte. 
By using these types of lithium ion-batteries, it is expected that the silent-watch endurance of military 
land vehicles will increase, but further research is needed before these battery types can be integrated to 
military land applications in terms of battery management systems. 
Li-ion batteries using ionic liquid electrolytes or molten salts are also of interest for defence 
applications, as they show great potential to improve battery safety by decreasing the flammability of organic 
electrolyte solvents. However, the development of viable ionic liquid electrolytes remains a challenge 
that needs to be addressed by appropriate research actions. For example, suitable combinations of 
different ionic liquids with synergic physicochemical properties that are also stable against reduction still need 
to be found in order to meet the requirements for operative conditions of practical devices. 
Solid polymer electrolytes could be a key solution to overcome safety issues associated with liquid 
electrolytes. Indeed, solid-state batteries are considered to be an emerging option for next-generation 
batteries, promising high energy density, high levels of safety, low costs and a long life cycle. However, the 
current poor ionic conductivity at room temperature and the loss of mechanical properties in the conductive 
molten state at higher temperatures limit their spread in the battery market. 
Research actions also need to be launched on Li-S batteries (a subset of lithium-metal batteries), with 
regard to their potential to increase batteries energy capability at a low cost. Despite a series of 
characteristics problems such as poor stability and low cycle life, Li-S batteries show great potential, 
especially for high-energy applications, as they can offer a theoretical energy density more than five 
times that of Li-ion batteries. Li-S batteries also have the advantage of not containing any environmentally 
harmful fluorine, but on the other hand new manufacturing processes will be needed to make them 
commercially viable. 
It should be noted, however, that Li-ion batteries using ionic liquid electrolytes and Li-S batteries are 
immature technologies, and therefore they are not expected to be immediately relevant to military land 
vehicles. Eventual research on them could, however, provide advantages for the defence sector in the longer 
term. 
Li-ion batteries are also important for powering soldier-portable devices. Performance requests for 
batteries will increase in the future, for example due to remote wireless devices ensuring more efficient 
communications, monitoring military equipment and providing instant access to strategic information. 
Batteries with a higher gravimetric/volumetric energy density are highly desirable to reduce the 
weight and volume of the batteries to be carried by each soldier. In this regard, lithium carbon 
monofluoride (Li-CFx) and Li-air represent two emerging and promising chemistries for soldier-
portable batteries, as they both are characterised by a very high specific energy density. Li-CFx batteries 
have one of the highest energy densities of all commercial lithium primary batteries known to date. However, 
due to typically limited current, the Li-CFx battery is not used in high-power applications. Li-air batteries have 
a theoretical specific energy even higher than Li-CFx cells, being considered by specialists as the next 
revolutionary step in battery power. In practice such a high specific energy has not yet been achieved due to 
cell-construction considerations. As such, Li-air batteries are still far away from commercial applications, and 
research still needs to be conducted to fix the issues related to this battery chemistry, especially with regard 
to improving the cycling stability (expected to reach market by 2040). The construction of an electrochemical 
cell that takes advantage of both the Li-CFx and the Li-air chemistries is also under consideration. 
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3.3. Key players in the Li-ion battery supply chain 
The key players in the Li-ion cell supply chain are shown in Figure 2. Europe produces only 2 % of the raw 
materials, and the current Europe contribution to global manufacturing of cell components in Li-
ion battery is negligible (< 1 %). China is the major supplier in the whole Li-ion cell supply chain — 
from raw materials to battery cells. Other key players in the supply chain are Japan and South Korea for 
processed materials and components, and South Korea and the United States for the production of Li-ion 
cells. In Figure 3, an overview is given of the raw materials, processed materials and components required in 
Li-ion technology that have been considered in the analysis. The country (region) shares shown in Figure 2 are 
estimated correspondingly. 
Figure 2. Li-ion batteries: key players in the supply chain 
 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 3. Li-ion batteries: an overview of raw materials, processed materials and components considered in the analysis 
 
Source: JRC 
3.4. Overview of supply risks for the Li-ion battery supply chain 
An overview of the various supply risks (issues) and bottlenecks for Li-ion batteries is shown in Figure 4. Very 
high supply risk is observed for the last step of the supply chain — Li ion cells production. A high 
risk of bottlenecks is also detected for the supply of raw and processed materials, while a 
medium level of risk is estimated for the supply of components. 
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Figure 4. Overview of supply risks and bottlenecks in the supply chain of Li-ion cells/batteries 
 
Source: JRC 
3.4.1. Supply risks for Li-ion battery raw materials 
China delivers one third of the raw materials required in Li-ion batteries and is the major supplier of eight of 
the 13 raw materials selected as being relevant to Li-ion batteries in this study. Other key suppliers are 
Australia (7 %) and Chile (6 %). Europe is fully dependent on the supply of 11 raw materials. More than half 
of the raw materials are supplied by numerous smaller suppliers, providing an opportunity for supply 
diversification. An overview of the raw materials suppliers for Li-ion batteries is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Raw materials suppliers for Li-ion batteries: overview 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017. 
The materials of particular importance are Co, C (natural graphite), Si, F and P, which are flagged as critical to 
the EU economy in the 2017 CRM list. Around half of the CRMs in Li-ion batteries are provided by China. The 
second key supplier of CRMs for batteries is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (13 %) (Figure 6). Another 
key material receiving global attention and anticipated to become critical for batteries is lithium. The 
production and processing of Li will have to be strongly upscaled (possibly more than 10 times according to 
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some scenarios) to match future demand. This might create severe shortages in the supply of Li in future over 
the longer term (2050 and beyond) (Engineering and Technology, 2018). 
Figure 6. Supply of CRMs for Li-ion batteries: key players 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017. 
In view of the large quantities of raw materials needed to address the exponential growth of Li-ion battery 
demand globally, some insights are provided further for three particular materials, which have the potential 
to become a bottleneck for Li-ion batteries. 
The demand for cobalt is expected to rise sharply, especially with the market launch of electromobility and 
the Li-ion batteries required for this purpose. The second supply risk is linked to the geopolitical stability of 
the producing country. Currently, 54 % of cobalt mine production comes from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, which is associated with unstable political conditions and difficulties in doing business. Cobalt 
refineries are rarely located near the source mine sites. Instead, major refiners purchase cobalt concentrate 
from various mines, ship to their own locations and refine cobalt into a usable form for cathode production. 
Based on the huge investments made in this sector, the majority of cobalt refining now takes 
place in China. 
Around 90 % of lithium is produced in Australia, Chile and Argentina, mostly from brine and spodumene 
sources. Despite the recent fears of shortages and price spikes the supply of lithium is not expected to 
be an issue for the battery supply chain in the short or medium term (Jaffe, 2017). In the longer 
term, however (2050 and beyond), shortages in the supply of lithium could be expected globally, depending of 
course on the deployment scenario (Engineering and Technology, 2018). 
China supplies around 70 % of the global production of natural graphite, with the iron and steel 
industry being the main driver for its demand. About 10 % of natural graphite demand currently goes into 
battery applications to manufacture anodes (Dougher, 2018). Although more expensive, synthetic graphite is 
a viable substitute for natural graphite. In these conditions, the supply risk for graphite can be 
considered moderate. 
Overall, China is the major supplier of around half of these three raw materials used in Li-ion 
batteries. 
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3.4.2. Supply risks for Li-ion cell processed materials 
Asia, represented by China, Japan and South Korea, delivers 86 % of the processed materials and components 
for Li-ion batteries globally, with China alone providing 48 %, followed by Japan and South Korea. Europe has 
a relatively small share of the supply, at 7-8 %. Other countries deliver only 6-7 %, which gives very little 
margin for supply diversification. In particular, Europe is fully dependent on the supply of processed natural 
graphite, artificial graphite, NCA cathode material, anode and separators. 
Two anode materials (processed natural graphite and artificial graphite) and three cathode materials (NCA, 
nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC) and lithium cobalt oxide (LCO)) are analysed in this study. China is the 
major supplier of anode materials, as well as NMC and LCO processed materials, while Japan is the key 
supplier of NCA cathode material. Europe is fully dependent on anode materials and NCA cathode material 
supply, and delivers around 18 % of NMC materials and 15 % of LCO materials (Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Country production shares of processed materials relevant to Li-ion batteries 
 
Source: JRC, BNEF, 2019. 
A critical aspect for Europe is the lack of European capacity to produce important processed 
materials for Li-ion batteries, such as anode materials and NCA cathode material. European 
companies produce less than 20 % of NMC and LCO materials globally, but this might not be enough to 
satisfy the European demand for Li-ion batteries. 
Even if Europe were able to manufacture the required anode and cathode materials, the supply of appropriate 
‘battery’-grade raw materials is another critical aspect. For example, not all nickel in the global supply 
chain is suited for Li-ion battery production. High-grade nickel products are required to produce nickel 
sulphate, which represents a principal ingredient in NMC and NCA cathode batteries. 
3.4.3. Supply risks for Li-ion cell components 
The major supplier of components for Li-ion batteries is again China (48 %), followed by Japan and South 
Korea. European companies supply around 30 % of overall cathode production and 4 % of electrolytes 
globally. There is no European production of anodes and separators. The country production shares of Li-ion 
battery components are shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Country production shares of components relevant to Li-ion batteries 
 
Source: JRC, BNEF, 2019. 
3.4.4. Supply risks for Li-ion cells 
Europe is almost fully dependant on imports of both battery cells and their constituting raw and processed 
materials, exposing the industry to supply uncertainties and potential high costs. China is definitely the major 
player in manufacturing Li-ion cells — 66 % of global cell production. Other suppliers are South Korea and 
United States, with 13 % each. Europe has very marginal production, with 0.2 % of Li-ion cells (10). Other 
suppliers provide around 8 % of the global supply, therefore the margin for supply diversification is also 
limited in this case. 
In the short term, a large increase in the production capacity of Li-ion cells is expected to be realised by 
Chinese companies, which will guarantee the dominance of China in the battery market into the near future. It 
is also expected that global original equipment manufacturers, cell manufacturers and suppliers will compete 
with each other to secure their battery supply chains and to secure access to the five essential battery raw 
materials — lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and manganese. 
3.5. Civil versus military battery supply chains 
While Li-ion batteries are crucial for defence applications, their development and future uptake is primarily 
driven by the civilian demand for portable electronic devices and, more recently, electric vehicles. Many Li-ion 
batteries for common military applications are currently assembled from commercial cells manufactured in 
Asia, meaning that in times of crisis there is no guarantee of logistical availability, military storage capability 
or interchangeability. 
As for civil applications, the defence battery supply chain starts with the raw materials used to produce 
battery components and covers all other stages of cell manufacturing up to the assembly of the final military 
product. The first steps in the battery supply chain, namely the supply of raw materials, their 
processing and the manufacturing of electrodes, are mostly common to both the civil sector and 
the defence sector. 
However, batteries need to be more resistant to physical damage and stable in extreme working conditions 
specific to military operations (e.g. explosive decompression, submersion, thermal and mechanical shock, sand 
and dust storms). For weapons or support systems in particular, the battery’s dimensions, capability and 
storability need to be specifically designed to meet military requirements. Consequently, more emphasis 
must be put upon pack design and assembly, including control systems, electronics and thermal 
management. 
                                           
(10) It should be noted that using company headquarters has its limitations. For example, if the geographical location of companies is 
considered, Europe would appear to be the supplier of around 5 % of Li-ion cells globally. 
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By taking into account the ongoing shift in military preferences towards secondary rechargeable 
batteries and an increasing demand for them in coming years, a secure supply chain will be required, in 
particular for rechargeable Li-ion batteries. There are three major concerns regarding the supply of Li-ion 
batteries that are also applicable to the defence sector. 
1. The security and surge (11) capability of the supply chain for the manufacturing of battery cells: 
all required materials and battery components need to be obtained from secure sources alongside the 
creation of new battery production capacity throughout the supply chain. 
2. The very high cost of establishing new manufacturing facilities for battery cells outside Asia 
(e.g. the total investment cost for a battery gigafactory is estimated at between USD 7.5 billion and 
USD 10 billion (CleanTechnica, 2019). 
3. The possible incompatibility of the dimensions, design standards, safety risks, testing 
protocols and reliability requirements of batteries, as well as long procurement times for 
specialised military purposes in comparison to the commercial production of the component cells (12). 
The rechargeable batteries used in defence applications, in particular Li-ion, are almost entirely 
assembled from processed materials and cell components manufactured outside the EU, 
especially in Asia. Defence ministries typically limit their risks by contracting with national battery 
manufacturing integrators that are aware of ‘defence’-related requirements. These companies procure cells 
from outside (primarily Asian) suppliers, integrate them into batteries together with supporting electronics, 
which they also procure, and provide the battery management system to manage the power needs required 
for the military system the battery is designed to fit in. In the same way, defence ministries fund the 
development and production of defence-specific application-specific integrated circuits (which use 
electronic materials sourced internationally) by trusted suppliers to meet military specifications for 
sensitive military high-performance applications (e.g. electronic warfare systems). 
As the defence sector needs smaller volumes of batteries than civil markets, defence battery 
requirements are not a major driver for the R & D investments of battery companies. 
Consequently, European MoDs need to invest (as is currently done, for example, by the United States 
Defence Logistics Agency for advanced batteries for armoured vehicles) in advanced Li-ion battery 
manufacturing capabilities, to foster the development of European battery power systems that 
meet their needs. Indeed, as the integration of Li-ion technology into military applications increases, the 
absence of a major manufacturer in Europe should be addressed to ensure, in times of crisis, the logistical 
availability, military storage capability and interchangeability of military batteries. 
In the meantime, as cell manufacturers are unlikely to respond to the specific needs of the military industry, 
the defence sector could influence the latter through modules and battery assemblers, which procure large 
amounts of cells and therefore have the negotiating power to convey specific military requirements (Figure 9). 
The battery procurement timescales for military applications are typically quite long, with equipment often 
used for decades. 
                                           
(11) The potential for upscaling manufacturing capabilities adequately in order to meet the demand. 
(12) For instance, the voltage window of batteries employed in military land vehicles or other military applications might be different 
from the voltage window of those used in civil applications. As such, batteries used in military vehicles must be compatible with 
the right voltages, otherwise the electrical equipment on the vehicle could be damaged or the battery may never be fully charged. 
In this case a conversion device will be needed or additional changes to the vehicle’s electrical system will be necessary, which can 
introduce higher costs, increased complexity and additional inefficiencies into the system. 
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Figure 9. Procurement pathway of Li-ion batteries for the defence sector 
 
Source: JRC, private communication with experts 
3.6. Recommendations for policy actions and research to reduce bottlenecks in 
the Li-ion battery supply chain 
3.6.1. Recommendations at the level of raw materials for advanced Li-ion batteries 
Two main policy actions could be identified as potential mitigation measures at the level of raw materials, 
namely diversifying the supply and boosting recycling activities in Europe. More than 50 % of the raw 
materials used in Li-ion batteries for civil and defence applications are supplied by various smaller suppliers, 
which provides an opportunity for supply diversification. Securing trade agreements with such suppliers could 
be a way out in the event of a crisis or war that leads to potential supply interruptions. The overall suppliers 
of raw materials for Li-ion batteries are shown in Figure 5. Boosting the recycling of Li-ion batteries in 
Europe is seen as a no-regret solution that allows key materials such as cobalt, lithium, manganese and 
nickel to be recovered and reused in the production of new batteries. The recycling of military batteries inside 
the EU or their reuse in stationary energy storage applications also needs to be encouraged. 
3.6.2. Recommendations at the assembly level (Li-ion cells and battery systems) 
In general, building manufacturing capacity for domestic Li-ion cells will make Europe more resilient in 
relation to the supply of Li-ion batteries for both the civil sector and the defence sector. Providing an 
attractive investment environment for European companies to invest in Europe rather than outside Europe, 
which is the current situation, is part of this effort. 
Specific defence-related recommendations at assembly level can be also identified as follows. 
— Establish European production capacity for Li-ion batteries throughout the supply chain, 
with complete electronics and packaging suitable for both civil and military applications. 
— Create targeted funding programmes and cooperation between companies for initiating and 
scaling-up production of Li-ion cells addressing specific military requirements. 
— Launch innovation programmes to support collaborative R & D, involving co-investment from 
the military industry on the specific research topics listed below. 
3.6.3. Other policy and R & D recommendations for Li-ion batteries 
The following ‘dual-use’ research topics can be identified from the analysis performed. 
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— Further research to reduce the amount of critical materials (such as cobalt) in Li-ion cells. 
The potential consequences of the substitution of one material with another (e.g. cobalt with nickel) 
should also be carefully examined in order to avoid a bottleneck somewhere else. 
— Research on alternative advanced cathode materials, i.e. so-called conversion materials such as 
transition metal oxides (MnxOy, NiO, FexOy, CuO, Cu2O, MoO2, etc.) representing a valid alternative for 
cathode materials in future Li-ion batteries. Manganese and iron are of particular interest from a 
resources point of view. Technologically, however, the developments are not yet sufficiently far 
advanced. Specific problems include the volume changes, the high potential differences and 
the resulting stability of the cycles and their number, all of which represent topics for 
future research. If the transition from research to concrete applications is successful, the recycling 
potential of such batteries is expected to be greater than for the current Li-ion batteries. For 
instance, graphite is usually lost in the recovery process, as it is burned and used as an energy 
source. 
— Further research in the field of alternative anode materials in order to increase the energy 
density of a battery and prolong the battery life. The ongoing research efforts also need to be 
sustained at the industrial level to substitute carbon anodes with anode composed largely of silicon 
(so-called Si/C composite). Indeed, materials bottlenecks relating to the use of silicon are not 
expected. Although silicon anodes are generally viewed as being the next development in Li-ion 
battery technology, further research is required to understand and quantify silicon 
expansion in batteries, which can cause them to malfunction. 
— Research in the field of innovative electrolytes is also an ongoing effort to make batteries better 
performing and safer, and further developments are needed. The use of solid electrolytes, for 
example based on polymers with lithium ion-conducting electrolyte salts, is a promising direction to 
make batteries safer and improve the energy density. Work is also underway to produce composite 
electrolytes using ceramic or metal-organic nanoparticles (Chen and Vereecken, 2019). Another 
possibility is the development of fully ceramic electrolytes. 
— Further research on emerging advanced batteries such as Li-S and Li-air. Both batteries display 
the potential to be used in both civil and defence applications. Li-air is believed to deliver great 
potential for use in military applications, including soldier-portable batteries and aviation. The key 
advantage of a Li-air battery is that the active cathode, oxygen, is not carried inside but extracted 
from the surrounding air. This results in a great advantage in specific energy (Wh/kg), which is 
important for applications that are very sensitive to weight, such as soldier equipment and aircraft. 
Li-S batteries are a subset of lithium-metal batteries, and have the potential to increase the energy 
capability and safety of batteries at low cost. Li-S batteries are seen as the potential successors to 
Li-ion batteries, and are of high interest to both the civil sector (for mobile, including automotive, 
and/or static energy storage) and the defence sector (e.g. for military vehicles and as single portable 
batteries for soldiers). For military applications, Li-S batteries could provide advantages in terms of 
safety in case of electrical and physical abuse or punctures. 
— Research on Li-ion cell components, in particular related to materials development, optimisation 
and processing in order to enhance battery performance, reduce costs and improve safety, 
specifically for harsh military environmental conditions. 
— Further research on supercapacitors to make this technology more competitive with existing 
options for high-performance energy storage applications. Supercapacitors can be used as ‘energy 
reservoirs’ that smooth out power supplies to electrical and electronic equipment. They can also 
complement or replace batteries when high power delivery or uptake, intermittent energy 
with variable power demands and/or long cycling stability are required. This is mainly the 
case for electric vehicles. Supercapacitors can regulate the power they supply and prolong the service 
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life of battery systems. The development of supercapacitors can also contribute to the rapid growth 
of low-power electronics (wearable, portable electronic devices, etc.) and high-power military 
applications (e.g. guided missile technology, highly sensitive naval warheads) (W. Raza et al., 2018). 
Moreover, supercapacitors can offer better power systems for soldier-based applications, enabling 
improved design of the electronic equipment. 
With regard to specific ‘defence’-related research needs, the following topics have been identified. 
— Research on system management should be considered to address specific military requirements 
such as thermal management, electromagnetic compatibility and safety of the battery. This will 
facilitate the integration of advanced Li-ion batteries in vehicles, aircraft, ships and weapons 
applications meeting military needs. System management is performed directly by the military 
manufacturer or by the battery assembler. Therefore, having battery assemblers in Europe will help 
respond to specific military needs, especially in times of crisis, and will contribute to the development 
of European battery power systems able to meet the needs of the defence industry. 
— Research on Li-ion batteries with lithium iron phosphate as the cathode material and lithium 
titanate replacing the graphite in the anode to improve the specific energy and reduce discharging 
and costs. These battery types (13) are of interest to the naval and land defence sectors, 
especially for military vehicle applications in relation to providing ‘silent-watch’ 
conditions. 
The current know-how in relation to Li-ion battery production was developed primarily by civil companies 
serving consumer electronics markets in particular, creating over time geographically located robust supply 
chains and production experience. In order to position itself independently of the cell manufacturers and 
battery assemblers, the military industry needs also to build up extensive know-how in the field of electrical 
energy storage and conversion in electrochemical cells and fuel cells. 
                                           
(13) Although lithium iron phosphate and lithium titanate batteries are commercially produced, they are normally not used for powering 
vehicles. They are in any case an attractive solution for use in military vehicles to ensure the silent watch of the vehicles, but 
further integration work needs to be done.  
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4. Fuel cell technology 
The importance of fuel cells as a power solution providing operational advantages to different mobile, 
stationary and portable defence applications is investigated in this report. Attention is also given to the 
supporting hydrogen production and storage technologies. The global fuel cell market for industrial and 
military applications is expected to grow by a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 18 % in the next few 
years. 
Fuel cells are compact, lightweight, highly efficient devices that have the ability to produce clean, reliable 
electricity from hydrogen (or other fuels) on-site that can be used in a variety of ways. Fuel cells require 
less maintenance and zero lubricants, increase endurance and ensure a high specific energy and 
power density, beyond that which can be achieved using conventional battery power. In addition 
they have the potential to reduce sound and thermal signatures, which is an essential advantage 
for defence applications. 
4.1. Applications and demand for fuel cells 
Fuel cells can be used in a wide range of products, ranging from very small fuel cells in portable devices such 
as mobile phones and laptops, through mobile applications like cars, delivery vehicles, buses and ships, to 
heat and power generators in stationary applications in the domestic and industrial sectors. Fuel cells are 
rapidly establishing a foothold in the civilian stationary generation market, acting as a source of backup 
power or allowing consumers to unplug from the grid entirely, and military customers are following suit. Fuel 
cells are currently used in three main areas: stationary power generation (a 67 % market share), 
transportation (32 %) and portable power generation (< 1 %) (Technavio, 2017). 
The global fuel cell market for industrial and military applications is expected to grow by a CAGR 
of 18 % in the next few years. In particular, the fuel cell market for the automotive industry is expected to 
grow by a CAGR of 9 % by 2021, with increasing demand for fuel cells in material-handling vehicles, light-
duty vehicles, buses and the aerospace sector. Although fuel cell technology has come a long way in relation 
to technology maturity, large-scale deployment in the domestic and industrial segments has not yet taken 
place. Other forms of energy conversion still remain competitive, and ongoing R & D is focused on cost 
reduction and life-cycle cost management. 
The defence sector could gain noticeably from the unique features of fuel cells, which can provide tactical 
benefits to and increase the efficiency of the army. There is strong military interest in fuel cells as a 
means of reducing the logistics burden. Military forces are acting in areas where local fuels often do not 
comply with European/US standards and thus are not suitable for use in military vehicles (e.g. due to high 
sulfur content). Fuel cells (with reformers to generate hydrogen for the cells) allow military forces to generate 
power in the operational theatre (e.g. for power generation in military bases) using local fuels or other sources 
(e.g. diesel, petrol, ethanol, propane, JP-8), reducing the need to transport fuel with the associated high 
logistics costs and levels of risk. 
Fuel cells of particular interest for defence application are low-temperature polymer electrolyte 
membrane fuel cells (LT-PEMFCs), alkaline fuel cells (AFCs), molten carbonate fuel cells (MCFCs), solid oxide 
fuel cells (SOFCs) and DMFCs. Fuel cells can save energy and reduce the operating costs associated 
with dependence on foreign oil. Fuel cells can be used in remote locations to ensure electric power 
for battery charging, auxiliary power for surveillance and regular power for communication 
equipment. 
The military benefits of using fuel cell-based vehicles capable of using logistics fuels include transporting 
required equipment and conducting autonomous resupply missions and stealth missions. Stealth for silent-
watch-type operations is one of the most promising benefits of hydrogen fuel cell technologies 
when it comes to military applications. 
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Other advantages for the military that fuel cells can provide are as follows. 
— Increased power and energy density for greater range and endurance. 
— Efficient power generation, especially at low electrical loads to reduce resupply. 
— Exportable power cable. 
— Technology enabler for long range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance payloads and 
mission scenarios. 
— Reduced thermal signature operations. 
— Low refuelling times (less than 5 minutes) similar to current petrol/diesel vehicles. 
— Low fuel consumption when idle (unlike battery-powered electric vehicles). 
— High wheel torque generation for off-road driving. 
— Water generation for field uses. 
The benefits of fuel cells for UMVs are that they are compact, lightweight and reliable, with a high 
specific energy and power density compared to conventional batteries (efficiencies of ~ 50-65 %), 
allowing bigger payloads and longer runtimes. The on-board fuel cells can support long missions of about 300 
to 400 miles without needing to be recharged, and the vehicle can use any kind of power to generate 
hydrogen, including JP-8 (jet fuel), solar (water), natural gas or other petroleum-based fuels. The possibility of 
also using fuel cells in UGVs and UAVs is also being seriously explored by the army. 
Today the use of primary batteries is mostly obsolete for armies, but even rechargeable batteries are heavy. 
Against this backdrop, fuel cells offer the potential to significantly reduce the weight of the batteries carried 
by soldiers. A typical soldier can carry a dozen devices, from standard equipment — such as radios, GPS units, 
and night-vision goggles — to improvised-explosive-device-jamming and mine-detecting devices, all requiring 
electrical power. Portable military equipment is also an application that could benefit from fuel cell 
technology. The weight slows down soldiers on foot, tethers them to constant resupply and contributes to 
muscular and skeletal injuries caused by excessively heavy packs. Relying solely on battery technology for 
power is problematic in the field. Batteries lose their charge, add significant weight and are insufficient to 
meet the needs for accessible energy. With fuel cell systems, all electronic devices, navigation tools, 
medical equipment and other electronics can be charged and operated in the field. Fuel cell 
technology has the potential to reduce the weight carried by soldiers significantly, allowing them to carry 
more ammunition and operationally important equipment (US DoE, 2017). The need for mobile auxiliary 
power units is widespread in the military, where communications and reconnaissance systems are 
operational while the vehicle engine is not running. Such units are needed in ground vehicles, ships, aircraft 
and non-tactical light-duty vehicles. The drawback of current battery systems is that they do not run as long 
as desired. Diesel generators give off undesirable, detectable emissions such as noise, heat, vibrations and 
particulate matter, making their operation around personnel problematic. In particular, SOFCs, DMFCs and 
PEMFCs are relevant for portable military applications. While DMFCs are the leading fuel cell type for niche 
applications, SOFCs are considered the most promising type for military applications for which fuel availability 
is the major concern (WATT Imperium, 2019; Fuel Cells Bulletin, 2006; CERDEC, 2009; K. Cowey, 2004; Colpan, 
2008). 
Other applications are defence power supplies for military encampments in remote areas and combined 
heat and power applications, where waste heat from the power generation process can be used for 
heating and service water. 
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4.2. Technological challenges for fuel cells 
Various materials and technological challenges need to be overcome in order to ensure the mass deployment 
of fuel cells in the civil and defence sectors. Some of these challenges are: high sensitivity to hydrogen 
purity (e.g. LT-PEMFCs); catalyst poisoning (e.g. phosphoric acid fuel cells (PAFCs), high-temperature 
polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cells (HT-PEMFCs)); and corrosion issues due to high temperatures 
and/or aggressive environments (e.g. PAFCs, MCFCs, SOFCs). Challenges such as lightweight storage 
tanks and thermal management to shed waste heat are also common for civil and military applications. 
Operational difficulties that must be taken into account are that storage tanks suffer from hydrogen 
embrittlement after several recharges and are an explosive hazard if not handled properly. 
Challenges in liquid storage include high cost, complexity (need for very low temperatures and cryogenic 
vessels) and safety concerns. There are also logistics issues such as limited availability and refuelling that 
requires special equipment and skills. Therefore, liquid storage is not the optimum option to be used by the 
military. The energy required to get hydrogen in and out is an issue for reversible solid-state materials. 
Although not a challenge unique to fuel cell technology, high-performance sealing technology is a 
relevant aspect for the safe application of fuel cells. 
Some specific challenges related to defence technical requirements are as follows. 
— Operation in more challenging environmental conditions. Fuel cells that have to be used in 
military applications need to operate at very low (down to – 40 °C in some cases) temperatures, and 
also up to 60 °C. 
— Maintainability and transport requirements can also differ from civil applications. 
— Hydrogen production on-site. The military needs to be flexible and independent in relation to 
infrastructure, and therefore needs to have ability to produce hydrogen locally in the field. 
— Availability of alternative systems that work on logistic fuels. Fuel cells tolerating sulfur can 
facilitate military operations. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the fundamental research challenges and priorities in the field of fuel cells and 
hydrogen-storage technologies are common to civil and military applications, which provides a fertile 
background for synergistic research. 
4.3. Key players in the fuel cell supply chain 
The key players in the supply chain are shown in Figure 10. China is the major supplier of raw materials 
for fuel cells (22 %), followed by South Africa (11 %) and Russia (7 %). Europe produces only 5 % of the 
raw materials, but it is the largest producer of processed materials with a production share of about 
40 %. The largest manufacturers and suppliers of fuel cell components (including hydrogen vessels) 
and fuel cells are Asia (mainly Japan) and North America (United States and Canada). There are many 
European companies involved in fuel cell integration, but this step in the supply chain is not considered in the 
study. In Figure 11 an overview is given of the raw materials, processed materials and components required 
in fuel cell technology and considered in the analysis. The country (region) shares shown in Figure 10 are 
estimated correspondingly. 
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Figure 10. Fuel cells and hydrogen technologies: key players in the supply chain 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 11. Fuel cells and hydrogen technologies: an overview of raw materials, processed materials and components 
considered in the analysis 
 
Source: JRC 
4.4. Overview of supply risks for the fuel cell supply chain 
An overview of the various supply risks and bottlenecks for fuel cells and related hydrogen technologies is 
shown in Figure 12. The bottleneck assessment performed showed that the risk to the supply of fuel cells 
is potentially very high. A high risk of supply issues is estimated for the first step in the supply 
chain — raw materials. No supply issues should be expected for the other two steps in the supply chain. 
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Figure 12. Overview of supply risks and bottlenecks in the supply chain of fuel cells and hydrogen technologies 
 
Source: JRC 
4.4.1. Supply risks for fuel cell and hydrogen technology raw materials 
Europe is fully dependent on the supply of 19 of the 29 raw materials relevant to fuel cell and hydrogen 
technologies (production and storage). Raw materials that are particularly essential for the production and 
storage of fuel cells and hydrogen, and that are difficult to substitute, highly priced and have a highly 
concentrated supply, are the PGMs — Pt in particular, but also Pd, Rh and Ru. The major suppliers of PGMs are 
South Africa and Russia. China is the main supplier of 10 of the 29 materials required in fuel cells. As for Li-
ion batteries, however, more than half of the raw materials for fuel cells are provided by numerous smaller 
supplier countries, thus providing a good possibility of supply diversification. An overview of the different raw 
materials suppliers for fuel cells and supporting hydrogen technologies is shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. Raw materials suppliers for fuel cells and hydrogen technologies: overview 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017. 
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Eleven materials, namely Pt, Pd, Co, Rh, REEs, C (natural graphite), Ru, Si, Mg, B and V, are flagged as critical 
to the EU economy in the 2017 CRMs list. China provides more than one third of the critical materials required 
in fuel cells and associated H2 supporting technologies, followed by South Africa (17 %) and Russia (13 %) 
(Figure 14).  
Figure 14. Supply of CRMs for fuel cells and hydrogen technologies: key players 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017. 
4.4.2. Supply risks for fuel cell and hydrogen technology processed materials 
Europe appears to be the major supplier of processed materials for fuel cells (40 % share), 
followed by the United States (28 %), China (10 %) and Japan (7 %). Other countries provide only around 
15 % of the processed materials. For four particular materials — namely CFCs; polymers (PFSA — 
perfluorosulfonic acid); carbon cloth/paper; and nanomaterials and carbon nanotubes — Europe produces 
between 15 % and 20 % of the global supply, which could be expected to be insufficient to satisfy European 
demand. The countries’ production shares of processed materials relevant to fuel cells and hydrogen 
technologies are displayed in Figure 15. 
Figure 15. Country production shares of processed materials relevant to fuel cell and hydrogen technologies 
 
Source: JRC 
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4.4.3. Supply risks for fuel cell and hydrogen technology components 
Europe has relatively strong positions in relation to the supply of components, providing around 
25 % of the global supply. The major supplier of components is North America (44 %), followed by Asia 
(31 %). Europe has the capacity to produce all of the major components used in fuel cells, namely bipolar 
plates, catalysts, gas diffusion layers, membranes and hydrogen storage vessels. 
4.4.4. Supply risks for fuel cells 
With regard to manufacturing of fuel cells, European production is marginal — only 1 % of global 
production. The key players are North America and Asia. 
4.5. Civil versus military fuel cell supply chains 
Fuel cells are a promising power source for military applications as well. There is a large overlap between the 
civil and military needs, such as high energy density (greater than in currently available Li-ion technology), 
low parasitic power, simplified balance of plant (BOP), high degree of safety and a wide power range. 
Nevertheless, the main military interests rely on only a part of the overall technology chain, focusing on 
distributed, thus local, hydrogen production and on specific fuel cell types, mostly DMFCs, SOFCs and PEMFCs. 
Several companies are operating in both the civil sector and the defence sector, including ACAL Energy (United 
Kingdom), Accumetrics (United States) and Plug Power (United States). There are other interesting examples 
of fuel cells where companies have used international partnerships to strengthen the fuel cell supply chain, 
which may suggest an approach that could strengthen this supply chain in the EU. In both cases the 
companies concerned have a strong presence in the military and civil domains and have entered partnerships 
to increase the size of the markets they can access. In addition, such a partnership enables companies to 
offer new technologies to their customers. 
For instance, General Motors (United States) and Honda (Japan) have been collaborating on fuel cell 
technology development since 2013, with the aim of producing next-generation hydrogen fuel cell systems 
for both companies’ future military and civil products starting in 2020 (Forbes, 2017). The goal is to reduce 
the cost of development and manufacturing. 
SFC Energy (Germany) teamed up with ZeroAlpha Solutions (United Kingdom) to trial SFC fuel cell technology 
with the UK Ministry of Defence in 2017 in the Army Warfighting Experiment and Information Warrior 
exercises (SFC, 2017). The fuel cells provided extended ‘silent-watch’ capabilities and enhanced 
endurance for both vehicle and dismounted applications. Fitelnet Oy (Finland) and Elbit Energy (Israel) 
are other companies providing fuel cells for the military. 
Sufficient information on companies providing fuel cells for the military could not be found, which limited the 
possibility to calculate defence-related supply shares and make a comparison with civil shares. 
4.6. Recommendations for policy actions and research to reduce bottlenecks in 
the fuel cell supply chain 
4.6.1. Recommendations at the level of raw materials for fuel cells and hydrogen 
technologies 
Diversifying the supply of raw materials is identified as a possible policy action. More than 50 % of the 
raw materials used in fuel cells and the supporting hydrogen technologies are supplied by various smaller 
suppliers (Figure 13), which provides a good opportunity for diversification. Securing trade agreements with 
such suppliers could be a way out in the event of a crisis or war that leads to potential supply interruptions. 
Substitution of PGMs in this technology is another measure which could reduce the raw materials 
dependency of Europe. 
35 
4.6.2. Recommendations at the assembly level (fuel cells) 
Several recommendations at the assembly level could be identified from the analysis performed. 
— Promoting common business cases and collaboration between the military and civil (dual-
use) sectors in the field of fuel cells to increase investment. 
— Stimulate the deployment of highly competitive awards-based programmes that encourage 
domestic small businesses to engage in European defence R & D that has the potential for 
commercialisation, i.e. high technology readiness level.  
— Creating R & D and procurement collaboration with other countries that are well placed in 
terms of the technology readiness and manufacturing readiness of fuel cell and hydrogen storage 
systems, such as Japan, United States and Canada. 
— Support an increase in manufacturing opportunities in Europe by creating an attractive 
investment environment. 
4.6.3. Other policy and R & D recommendations for fuel cells and hydrogen technologies 
While fuel cells are becoming competitive for specialised applications, their cost is still the major challenge to 
their broad introduction to the market. Cost reductions are mainly expected from increased production and the 
related learning curves. A beneficial effect on costs will also be provided by the replacement of expensive 
materials and components with cheaper alternatives, while retaining the same overall performance. Since 
catalysts are a major cost driver, their substitution in fuel cells is already a topic of ongoing research (e.g. 
Partial-PGMs, CritCat projects, Horizon 2020 projects). 
The long-term performance of hydrogen components, material–hydrogen compatibility for metallic storage 
systems and components, and innovative hydrogen storage in solid materials (e.g. carbon nanotubes, boron 
nitride, graphene and other hybrid nanomaterials, glass capillary arrays, glass microspheres, doped polymers, 
etc.) are all common to both the civil sector and the defence sector, where research is already being carried 
out. 
In general, future ‘dual-use’ research could be done to: 
— develop low-cost materials and components for hydrogen storage systems; and 
— develop low-cost, high-volume manufacturing methods. 
Research is also needed on fuel cell system integration for different applications. 
For military purposes, operating fuel cell systems independently from a hydrogen infrastructure is 
an essential point. The hydrogen needs to be produced on-site. This aspect is especially important for mobile 
fuel cell applications, but also for defence applications in general, with regard to logistical topics. The most 
feasible way to produce hydrogen for military purposes is to reform diesel fuel or kerosene, as both fuels are 
readily available in the armed forces and logistics are available for these types of fuels. However, logistic 
fuels contain some amount of sulfur, which is detrimental to fuel cells as it poisons the noble metal catalysts. 
Desulfurisation is therefore considered to be a very important step in fuel-processing technologies. Carbon 
monoxide (CO) must also be removed to prevent the degradation of the fuel cell’s platinum catalyst. 
— Research on portable on-site fuel reformers and desulfurisation methods (innovative 
materials for on-site H2 purification) applicable directly on logistic fuels is a possible research area. 
— The development of systems that would operate on logistic fuels is another specific defence-
related topic. 
Challenges to be met involve the miniaturisation of systems and the ability to tolerate fuels 
containing sulfur. An example of such fuel cells is the recently announced enzymatic fuel cell, which has the 
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potential to power everything from electronic devices to cars and off-grid power systems (Newatlas, 2014). 
Still, advances in relation to size and capacity have to be made to ensure the large-scale deployment of this 
technology for both civilian and military use. 
Non-desulfurised hydrogen can however be used safely in certain types of fuel cell, such as HT-PEMFCs, 
without disturbing the functioning of the cell and while providing higher efficiency. However, water loss and 
the coincident increase in membrane resistance to proton conduction are significant barriers to the high-
performance operation of traditional proton exchange membrane fuel cells at elevated temperatures 
where the relative humidity may be reduced. This could again be a subject for dual-use research, though the 
military could have the bigger advantage. 
The development of fuel cell systems (and related technologies) able to operate under harsh 
environmental conditions could give an advantage to the army, for instance during operations in Arctic or 
desert environments. 
Replacing methanol due to its toxicity with ethanol in DMFC is one more topic in which the military 
may have a particular interest. 
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5. Robotics 
5.1. Applications and demand for robotics 
Robotics is an emerging field of technology offering enormous potential for many civil and defence 
applications. Robots are currently widely applied in lots of areas, such as industry, agriculture, medicine, 
transportation, social services, the military, space exploration and undersea operations. The market for robots 
can commonly be categorised into two major segments based on their function and the market needs they 
are designed for, namely industrial robots (accounting for 80 % of the current market) and service robots 
(20 % of the current market, with almost half being robots for logistics). It is expected however that service 
robotics will displace industrial robotics in terms of sales and market value over the next two decades 
(Mordorintelligence, 2018). These two categories are further investigated in this study. Exoskeletons (or 
wearable robotics) have also been analysed due to their increasing importance and market share for both civil 
and defence applications. UVs, such as drones, are also sometimes referred to under the general heading of 
robotics, however they are investigated separately due to their specificities and increasing importance. 
It is difficult to predict the actual growth in robotics due to the variety of sectors making use of robots. A 
growth rate of between 10 % and >20 % is forecast for the different branches of the industrial and service 
robotics market. The growth projections for exoskeletons, which are also required in various sectors, are even 
more optimistic, forecasting a CAGR of up to 40-50 % in the next few years (The Business Research Company, 
2018). Robotics offers enormous potential for defence. Robots can perform military operations 
considered too risky, too complex or even impossible for humans. Military robots are autonomous 
or remote-controlled mobile robots designed for military applications, from transport, to search 
and rescue, to attack. Robots are used in the military on all three fronts — ground, water and sky — for 
rescue operations, disaster management, surveillance and security. Major tasks performed by robots include 
bomb disarmament, mine clearance, surveillance and help in search-and-rescue operations. Some other 
applications include image interpretation for target identification and classification, diagnosis and 
maintenance of sophisticated weapon systems such as radars and missiles, support and carriage of 
ammunitions, camera-equipped and shock-resistant platforms to provide firepower remotely, missile target 
range and trajectory analysis for evaluation of kill zones, launch times and simulations to assist in qualifying 
missile performance in various environments. 
Currently, exoskeletons represent only a small share of the global robotics market. However, their use in 
both the civil healthcare sector and the military sector is expected to increase steadily in the 
future. It is a continuously evolving field. The use of exoskeleton suits for military personnel could vastly 
improve the safety and strength of soldiers. While the development of military exoskeletons seems to be vital, 
the development of exoskeletons to be used in the medical world is also making great strides, and seems to 
have the potential to change the future of medicine. Due to the broad nature of the medical field, 
exoskeletons could be used to help patients, doctors and nurses alike (Fieldtex, 2017). 
5.2. Technological challenges for robotics 
The technological challenges relating to robotics can be divided into software- and hardware-related 
challenges. Software-related challenges include the ability to perform more and more intelligent tasks by 
using complex software architectures. For exoskeletons in particular, software to coordinate the 
exoskeleton’s movements is crucial, and continued improvements are needed. 
With regard to hardware challenges, continued developments in design at both the system (robot) and the 
component level is necessary. Main components such as gears, motors, power units, etc. need to become 
lighter and smaller, especially for exoskeletons, for which weight is a critical point. Smaller, more powerful, 
high-speed and precision electronics is another challenge for exoskeletons. Sensors are a critical and key 
component of robots. Research on sensors, which is an interdisciplinary field that includes electronics, element 
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mechanics, material science, measurement and control, signal processing, bioengineering, etc., is attracting 
increasing attention from robot researchers, and its complexity needs to be recognised. 
Materials are often a very important ingredient, allowing components to become smaller and lighter. For 
instance, the development of innovative materials (e.g. vanadium-based materials) could contribute to the 
creation of miniaturised, multifunctional motors and artificial muscles (RBR, 2013). A large amount of 
different materials are used in robotics in general. However, light metal alloys, such as titanium, 
magnesium and aluminium alloys, normally used in partnership with composites (CFCs, Kevlar, polymer–
metal composites, etc.) are of particular interest for robotics due to their favourable strength-to-weight ratios. 
Other innovative materials such as metallic glass, printed liquid metals and liquid silicone rubber are 
seen as potential game changers in the field of soft robotics. New materials and advances in making 
electronic skin for interactive robots are under development. Flexible (stretchable) electronics are 
realised via the synthesis of novel materials such as composites of soft materials with conductive fillers or 
via smart structural engineering and designs such as serpentine-like structures for interconnects or wires. One 
of the main challenges facing electronic skin development is the ability of the material to withstand 
mechanical strain and maintain sensing ability or electronic properties, including the fragility of sensors, the 
recovery time of sensors, repeatability, overcoming mechanical strain and long-term stability. More efficient 
robot designs will require multifunctional materials, integrating processes such as sensing, movement, energy 
harvesting and energy storage. Such materials can change over time to adapt or heal (Hammock et al., 2013). 
Recyclability and self-healing properties are therefore critical in the future design of new electronic skins. 
Military exoskeletons. In general, the defence industry needs cheaper and lighter exoskeletons, with longer 
battery lives, which would clearly give an advantage to the troops. Military exoskeletons face many of the 
same challenges as their civil counterparts, in relation to being comfortable to wear for many hours and their 
integration with already established military equipment and standards. Military exoskeletons have to be 
universal, yet comfortable and fully integrated with the soldier while operating on the battlefield. 
Furthermore, the exoskeletons have to be reliable and very durable, and have to keep working even under 
harsh conditions such as impact, humidity, pressure, very low or very high temperatures, etc. 
An important requirement for military robots is that they can incorporate signature-reduction (stealth) 
technologies including advanced materials to make them harder to detect . Such materials are 
magnetic (silicone, urethane, nitrile and neoprene) and dielectric (e.g. foams, plastics, elastomers-type 
polymers) absorbent materials. Low-emissivity paints are also used for vehicles to reduce emissivity in the 
infrared spectral band. Multispectral patterned textile netting is used to provide visual camouflage and to 
mitigate and reduce thermal signatures and near-infrared signatures (providing protection against thermal 
imagers and other related threats such as heat-seeking missiles). 
Another challenge for military robots (e.g. explosive ordnance disposal robots) is that they need to operate 
under tough conditions. Therefore, the main differences between civilian and military robot systems 
are mostly related to water-, dust- and shock-proofing the equipment. 
One more essential requirement for the military is ensuring the non-traceability of the devices; in other words 
that the enemy cannot make use of the device or the data collected by the device. Therefore, securing the 
data link and issues such as tempest shielding are very important. In addition to these issues, there are 
also a number of (quick) deployment aspects that are very important for military robots (and less so for 
their civil counterparts). Examples are the choice of the battery pack, which needs to be optimised not only for 
the longest possible operation time, but also for robust operation under very low and high 
temperatures, resistance to shocks, safe air transportability, low maintenance, etc. In addition to the 
batteries, the fast-deployment requirements also impact the design of the robotic tool itself, as in the military 
these tools are often transported using standardised pallet sizes, so the robot needs to stick to these design 
limits. 
Other issues ranging from cybersecurity to standards and regulations will need to be further addressed as the 
robotics sector develops. In this respect materials engineering, design, electronics and software are 
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some key areas in which further research is needed. However, such issues are not the main focus of the 
report. 
5.3. Key players in the robotics supply chain 
The key players in the robotics supply chain are shown in Figure 16. China is the major supplier of raw 
materials for robotics, followed by South Africa and Russia. Europe produces only 4 % of the raw 
materials, but it is among the largest producers of processed materials (20 % production share), 
along with the United States and China. The largest manufacturer and supplier of robotics components is the 
United States, followed by China and Japan. Europe, with a marginal production share of 4 %, is 
vulnerable in relation to the supply of components, but it has rather strong position in the last step, i.e. 
the supply of robots. The integration step of industrial robots has not been considered in the analysis. In 
Figure 17 an overview is given of the raw materials, processed materials and components required in robotics 
that have been considered in the analysis. The country (region) shares shown in Figure 16 are estimated 
correspondingly. 
Figure 16. Robotics: key players in the supply chain 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 17. Robotics: an overview of raw materials, processed materials and components considered in the analysis 
 
Source: JRC 
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5.4. Overview of supply risks for the robotics supply chain 
An overview of the various supply risks (issues) and bottlenecks for robotics is shown in Figure 18. The 
bottleneck assessment that was performed showed that the risk to the supply of raw materials 
and components is potentially high, and that there is a medium risk in relation to the supply of 
processed materials and assemblies. Though Europe is one of the major producers of industrial and 
service robots, the highly concentrated supply and the expected rapid growth in demand are factors 
contributing to the medium supply risk assessed for the last step of the supply chain. Moreover, the lack of 
raw materials and components, the lack of a sufficiently skilled work force in Europe and the increasing 
competition from China (acquisition of leading European robotics companies by Chinese companies) are 
additional factors that may challenge the competitive position of Europe on the global market. 
Figure 18. Overview of supply risks and bottlenecks in the supply chain of robotics 
 
Source: JRC 
5.4.1. Supply risks for robotics raw materials 
In total, 44 raw materials were identified as being relevant to robotics and analysed in the study. Europe is 
fully dependent on the supply of 33 materials from outside, mainly from China, which provides more than one 
third of the raw materials required in robotics. Other key suppliers are South Africa and Russia, and there are 
many smaller suppliers. Europe provides around 4 % of the raw materials for robots. However, since more 
than 50 % of the materials for robotics are supplied by numerous smaller countries, there are significant 
opportunities for supply diversification. An overview of the different raw materials suppliers for robotics 
is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Raw materials suppliers for robotics: overview 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017. 
Nineteen of the 44 raw materials are flagged as critical to the EU economy, namely Ta, W, P, F, Ru, Rh, Ga, In, 
B, Pd, Pt, REEs, Bi, Sb, V, Mg, C, Si and Co. China also appears to be the key supplier of CRMs for robotics, 
providing more than 40 %, followed by South Africa (10 %) and Russia (around 9 %) (Figure 20). 
Figure 20. Supply of CRMs for robotics: key players 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017. 
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5.4.2. Supply risks for robotics processed materials 
In total 29 processed materials (including processed materials for Li-ion batteries and fuel cells) were 
identified as being relevant to robotics and analysed in the study. Europe is well positioned in the second 
step in the supply chain, supplying more than 20 % of the processed materials required in 
robotics. The major supplier of processed materials is the United States, with a 23 % share, 
followed by Europe (21 %), China (21 %) and India (13 %). There are also possibilities to diversify the 
supply if needed. It should be noted, however, that Europe is fully dependent on the supply of several 
processed materials such as specific Al alloys, semiconductors and aramid (Kevlar) fibre, for which the United 
States and India (for Al alloys) are key suppliers (Figure 21). Potential bottlenecks could also occur in the 
supply of specific steels required in robotics, along with processed materials for Li-ion batteries. The materials 
are listed arbitrarily, beginning with materials used in large quantities or essential functional materials for the 
technology (e.g. semiconductors). 
Figure 21. Country production shares of processed materials relevant to robotics 
 
Source: JRC 
5.4.3. Supply risks for robotics components 
The key supplier for components for robotics is the United States with around a 40 % share, followed 
by China (20 %) and Japan (18 %). Europe has marginal share of the supply of components — around 
4 %. Around 20 % of the components are provided by a number of small players. More concretely, the United 
States is the major supplier of actuators, controllers (microprocessors) and GPUs, and one of the key suppliers 
of sensors and fuel cells. Japan is the key supplier of gears, sensors and fuel cells. China is the major supplier 
of Li-ion batteries and magnets. Other key suppliers are Israel (actuators), South Korea (microprocessors and 
fuel cells) and Canada (fuel cells). Europe is one of the three major suppliers of sensors and actuators. 
However, Europe is strongly dependent on the supply of six of the eight analysed components, 
namely microprocessors, gears, GPUs, magnets, Li-ion batteries and fuel cells. Although chips and 
processors are not produced in Europe, robotics companies do not consider this to be a potential bottleneck, 
believing that there will be enough supply globally. Batteries, on the other hand, are seen as an imminent 
bottleneck. Future batteries are expected to be solid-state batteries, for instance solid-state lithium and 
graphene. The EU has introduced a very strong programme in graphene, but the intermediate steps are also 
important, and this might be semi-critical, according to experts in robotics. The country production shares for 
components used in robotics are shown in Figure 22. Components are listed arbitrarily. 
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Figure 22. Country production shares of components relevant to robotics 
 
Source: JRC 
5.4.4. Supply risks for robots 
Asia, mainly represented by Japan with a 47 % production share, is leading the industrial robotics market, 
followed by Europe (41 %) (Figure 16), while North America (mainly the United States) is better positioned in 
non-industrial robots. The United States also has the biggest number of highly innovative robotics companies. 
The EU is strongly positioned and a major player in the market of service robots (RockEU2, 2018), 
followed by North America and Asia (Figure 23). 
Figure 23. Country production shares of service robots 
 
Source: JRC, RockEU2, 2018. 
Europe is leading the market for civil exoskeletons, mainly for medical and industrial applications, 
followed by the United States (27%), Japan (11%) and numerous smaller players (Figure 24) (Exoskeleton 
Report, 2015) (14). The main application for exoskeletons is currently the medical sector. Defence represents 
only 8 % of the exoskeleton market. The key players in military exoskeletons are US companies. 
                                           
(14) Supply shares calculated based on number of companies per country. 
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Figure 24. Country production shares of exoskeletons 
 
Source: JRC, Exoskeleton Report, 2015. 
5.5. Civil versus military robotics supply chains 
There are various players operating in the civil and defence markets. The main civil industrial robotics 
companies are ABB Ltd (Europe), Mitsubishi (Japan), Yaskawa Electric Corp (Japan), Kawasaki Robotics Inc. 
(Japan), Stäubli (Europe), KUKA Robotics (former European and currently owned by a Chinese company 
(Technode, 2019), B+M Surface Systems GmbH (Europe), FANUC Robotics (Japan) and Rockwell Automation 
Inc. (United States), among others. 
The key players in military robotics believed to disrupt the defence robotics market are Boston Dynamics 
(United States), Ekso Bionics (United States), Neptec Technologies (Canada), Energid Technologies (United 
States), Robo-Team (United States), SRI International (United States), MRX Technologies (United States), M-
Tecks Robotics (France), Neya Systems (United States), Silent Falcon (United States) and Qinetiq Group (United 
Kingdom) (Disruptor, 2017). Other European companies include API Technologies (United Kingdom), BAE 
Systems (United Kingdom), Dassault Aviation (France), European Aeronautics Defense and Space (France), 
Finmeccanica (Italy), M-Tecks Robotics (France), SKYWATCH (Denmark) and Thales Group (France). 
In total around 50 defence robotics companies have been identified and considered in the analysis. The 
production shares in Figure 25 have been established in terms of the number of companies per country, and a 
clear prevalence of US companies can be observed (Disruptor, 2017; Venture Radar, 2018). 
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Figure 25. Country production shares of military robots 
 
Source: JRC, Disruptor 2017, Venture Radar 2018. 
With regard to exoskeletons, wearable robotics for the military is the most dynamic subset of the exoskeleton 
industry. Military exoskeletons are being tested by the Australia, Canada, China, Russia, South Korea, United 
Kingdom and United States. These are just the projects that the public is aware of. Many other military 
exoskeleton projects remain secret (Exoskeletonreport, 2016). 
5.6. Recommendations for policy actions and research to reduce bottlenecks in 
the robotics supply chain 
5.6.1. Recommendations at the level of raw and processed materials for robotics 
Securing access to the raw materials for which Europe has no domestic production, such as Cr, Co, Mo, C, Ni, 
Mg, V, Cu, Sn, Sb, Bi, etc., and diversifying the supply for the other raw materials are identified as being 
relevant policy measures at the level of raw materials. More than half of the relevant materials for robotics 
are supplied by multiple small suppliers, which gives good opportunities for the diversification of the 
supply. 
At the level of advanced materials the following ‘dual-use’ opportunities for R & D actions have been 
identified. 
— Development of advanced light and high-strength structural and functional materials is the 
main research line for robotics, including exoskeletons (or wearable robotics). Promising materials 
appear to be magnesium, aluminium, titanium alloys, special steels and composites (fibre reinforced), 
including combined polymer–metal composites. Pioneering materials for special applications 
such as multifunctional motors, artificial muscles (e.g. vanadium-based materials), etc. are 
also needed. 
— Development of innovative materials, including paints and textiles, to mitigate and reduce 
signatures for specific military applications. 
— Development of new materials and advances in making electronic skin for interactive 
robots and associated flexible or stretchable electronics such as smart textiles based on flexible 
carbon nanotube composite coatings (15); printed liquid metals (16), metallic glass (17) and liquid 
silicone rubber for soft robotics advancements. 
                                           
(15) Carbon nanotubes are produced from synthetic graphite, for which the primary feedstock can be calcined petroleum coke and coal 
tar pitch. Chemical vapour deposition is the most widely used method for the production of carbon nanotubes. Different metallic 
catalysts (based on Mg, Al, Co or Ni) are however used during this process.  
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5.6.2. Recommendations at the assembly level (robots) 
Several opportunities for R & D actions have been identified at the assembly level, namely the following. 
— Development of smaller, more powerful, high-speed and precision electronics. This is essential 
for the development of the future military and civil robotics. 
— Design optimisation of the robotic tools for military robots. Besides batteries, the design of 
the military robotic tools should also be suitable for transportation using standardised pallet sizes. 
— Cyber physical security of electronics systems (such as controllers) for military robotics 
applications. This is a key issue to be addressed as robotics systems develop increasing levels of 
autonomy, artificial intelligence and software integration. Potential adversaries might tamper with 
commercial off-the-shelf electronics and with associated software to affect the functionality of 
military equipment during procurement or in-service updates. Therefore R & D investment in 
methods to protect military systems (and critical civil infrastructure) against cyber 
supply-chain attacks will be required. Cybersecurity is thus an area from which civil–military 
synergies could arise. 
Military exoskeletons need to have increased strength and endurance in demanding environments, ensuring 
the high survivability of the soldiers and at the same time being light and comfortable to wear for many 
hours, as well as enabling integration with already-established equipment and standards. Specific research 
recommendations to meet similar requirements are both hardware and software related, such as the 
development of the following. 
— Smaller and more efficient power/energy sources (batteries, fuel cells or other alternative 
sources) (Quora, 2017; Xiaoping Ouyang et al., 2016) and electric motors. One of the most 
daunting problems to be solved in the field of exoskeletons is the creation of a compact power 
supply powerful enough to allow an exoskeleton to operate for extended periods without being 
plugged into an external power source. The choice of an optimal battery pack, resistant to low and 
high temperatures and shocks, and ensuring safe air transportability, long operation time and low 
maintenance, etc. is an important deployment aspect for military robots in general. 
— Armour with high ballistic performance (18) and increased blast and shrapnel protection. 
Other recommendations in the field of exoskeletons are software to coordinate exoskeleton 
movements, vital-sign and stress monitoring technologies, visual augmentation systems/operators, 
automated remote sensors for increasing situation awareness and reducing the surveillance (and cognitive) 
burden on soldiers, improved weapons interface, improved thermal management and improved 
communications connectivity. 
5.6.3. Other policy and R & D recommendations for robotics 
Besides the field of raw materials, other policy initiatives to support the development of the robotics sector in 
Europe could be as follows. 
— Ensure needs a sufficient high-skilled work force to attract and maintain robotics technical 
expertise. Robotics companies in Europe already perceive this as being a big potential bottleneck for 
the future development of this sector in Europe. Companies are interested in hiring enough high-level 
maths software engineers and people with robotics PhDs. The main concurrency in skilled work force 
is expected to come from China and India. Therefore, both companies and academia should be 
                                                                                                                                    
(16) Intrinsically stretchable liquid metals include eutectic Ga-In alloy (EGaIn) or Ga-In-Sn alloy (Galinstan). 
(17) Metallic glasses are a relatively new class of materials made from complex, multicomponent alloys. Various metals such as Mg, Ti, 
Al, Fe and Zr can be used as the feedstock. 
(18) Bullet-resistant or anti-ballistic materials are usually rigid, but may be supple. They may be complex, such as Kevlar, Lexan and 
carbon fibre composite materials, or they may be basic and simple, such as steel or titanium. 
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encouraged to identify skills gaps and skills shortages for the robotics sectors. Tailored retraining 
and skill-raising programmes can be an important follow-up, which the European Commission 
can support. It is also up to stakeholders (industry, academia, etc.) to take advantage of relevant EU 
funding, such as Erasmus and European Structural and Investment Funds. 
— Europe should strengthen its local robotic market and seek ways to increase and sustain 
internal market demand through various initiatives, actively involving robotic stakeholders. Support 
for the industry is needed in many ways, from increasing awareness and incentives to encouraging 
new and established companies to carry out advanced research and development. Providing funds 
for robotics research in terms of size, weight, technology, software, materials and applications is 
expected to significantly influence the European robotics market. Great emphasis should be put on 
SMEs as a growth strategy of the European civil and defence robotics market. Almost all major 
companies and factories in the region have been automated. The European Commission could 
incentivise promote incentivising the automation/robotisation of SMEs at Member State level. 
— Europe is lacking manufacturers of important components for robotics. The dominance of 
foreign suppliers, specifically for some higher-level components that are expected to be key 
components for future technological development (e.g. GPUs), is seen as a threat by the robotics 
industry. Therefore, strengthening and investing in the local components manufacturing 
industry would be profitable for robotics companies. It would increase production in Europe and 
prevent companies from setting up manufacturing plants in Asia. In addition, this would establish a 
new revenue stream for Europe through selling technologically advanced robotic components to 
robot manufacturers to other countries. The European Commission could invite Member States to 
define appropriate incentives for existing local robotic-components-related companies to invest in 
Europe, and support the development of new businesses. In addition, measures to discourage the 
inflow of components produced outside Europe could be defined again at Member State level. 
More potential policy initiatives aiming to strengthen Europe’s position in robotics are listed in the relevant 
JRC technical background report (MatDual, 2019). 
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6. Unmanned vehicles 
6.1. Applications and demand for unmanned vehicles (UVs) 
UAVs are used for various civil and commercial applications. These comprise remote sensing for aerial 
monitoring and investigation for agriculture, infrastructure inspection, border monitoring and surveillance, 
research and development, and other data-collection processes, along with the transport of goods, for 
example parcels in the logistics sector. The transport of passengers is still in the initial stage, however 
promising developments have been reported recently. 
The global UAV market is expected to grow by a CAGR of between 18 % and 27 % over the next few years 
(Research Nester, 2019; MarketWatch, 2019; TechSci Research, 2019). Much higher growth of > 80 % CAGR is 
anticipated for particular drone sectors, such as smart commercial drones (Reuters, 2018a). Industry analysts 
have considered UAVs to be a ‘market discontinuity’ due to their disruptive innovation, which is fundamentally 
changing the capabilities in the aeronautics sector (Valerdi, 2005). The impact of the shift from manned 
aircraft to UAVs in both society and the military is tremendous, due not only to the mere expansion of the 
number of aircraft, but also to the quality of the newly offered services. Manned military aircraft will be 
gradually replaced by unmanned ones (between 30-50 % by 2020 (DefenceProAc, 2019)), while it seems only 
a matter of time until this process also affects the civil sector. 
The market for UGVs is anticipated to grow by a CAGR of more than 11 % by 2025, and the major 
applications of the vehicles will serve the defence sector (Markets and markets, 2019). A similar growth rate 
is also expected for the unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs — including underwater and surface vehicles) 
market for the same period (Unmanned Maritime Vehicles, 2013). 
Initially, UAVs were predominantly used under environmental and other conditions that prohibited the use of 
manned aircraft. In this way they extended the operating range of manned aircraft. Accordingly, UAVs were 
used predominantly in military applications, with breakthroughs from the development of the predator and 
global hawk drone programmes (Kindervater, 2016). The most important military applications of UAVs are 
reconnaissance; target and decoy; attack capability to support combat activities; remote sensing, in particular 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear sensing; and the delivery of military cargo to and near combat 
zones, including lethal and non-lethal payloads. The more the UAVs are integrated with classical weapon 
systems and/or with each other, so-called multi-UAV systems, the more they will support the vigour needed in 
combat areas. 
Starting from the 1970s, the civil applications of UAVs gained ground, and civil UAVs are clearly dominating 
the market regarding the number of units, with over a million units sold by 2015 in various fields of 
application such as agriculture, provision of data for science, logistics and commerce. However, the market 
size in terms of value is still clearly dominated by military applications, followed by commercial and hobby 
applications (Statista, 2019a). Also, the environmental requirements are now usually more demanding for 
military applications than for civil applications. For defence systems, operating temperatures are typically 
from below 0 °C (in certain cases down to – 40 °C) to up to 60 °C. Furthermore, the requirements regarding 
maintainability and transport can also differ from civil applications. 
The defence market for UAVs is today dominated by large UAVs, and it is expected that this will remain the 
case for the next two decades. The defence industry has in recent years witnessed a growth in the application 
of other types of UVs and cybersecurity. C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance), cyber security, embedded computing and UVs are key applications with 
potential growing markets. Based on the developments in the UAVs’ market for defence applications, it can be 
predicted that the impact on surveillance by UVs will be significant (EASME, 2017). Autonomous and robotic 
systems are expected to make a significant change to military operations within the 2021-2040 time frame, 
at both the global scale and the national scale. 
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6.2. Technological challenges for unmanned vehicles 
The technological progress in aviation, both civil and military, documents meaningful advancements with 
major improvements in power supply, range and speed (Manzotti, 2016). In addition, the rapid development of 
the UAV technology benefited from the accelerative robotics advancements in the last decades. Nevertheless, 
certain technological issues pose a challenge when tapping the full potential of the promising UAV technology. 
Fuel cells are already a common source of energy supply in unmanned marine systems. However, they are 
still a niche product in UAVs. Due to increased energy intensity, the flight capacity (operating range and time) 
of UAVs can be extended up to threefold when compared to batteries. In addition, (1) refuelling times are 
much lower when applying a removable-tank design concept, (2) the overall vehicle maintenance is lower and 
(3) the logistical footprint is smaller. A technological challenge for fuel cell engines is the lower power 
density than batteries and internal combustion engines, and the higher investment cost per unit. 
Thus, a marketable portable and portable hydrogen refuelling solution is required (Ballard, 2019). 
Specific challenges related to defence UV technical requirements are as follows. 
— As environmental requirements are demanding for military UAV applications, the failure of their 
components is possible, for example during take-off or landing, or due to collisions with aircraft or 
projectiles. In order to significantly reduce the ‘logistic delay time’ in the case of damage, the 
possibility to repair the UAV is of key importance to ensure a high level of functionality . 
AM enables relevant components to be printed at the location of use (19). It is a technological 
challenge to develop deployable mobile AM units that are able to print UAV components for a specific 
soldier’s needs during their mission at an acceptable speed. Today, the printing time of a whole UAV 
is still around 20 hours (Busachi et al., 2018). 
— Availability of alternative systems that enhance on fuel logistics. Fuel cells with an 
enhanced sulfur-content tolerance level can facilitate military operations in areas where the supply 
of purified fuels is not ensured (see Chapter 4) 
— In the maritime defence sector, UUVs are required to become more resistant against shaking 
or shocks due to the explosion of naval mines. Materials used to support such resistance are (in 
general, not only for maritime systems) certain composite materials (20) and speciality steels (armour 
steels), for example Armox 370T (Army Technology, 2013) (rolled homogeneous armour plate that 
combines good resistance to penetration with excellent toughness). 
— Beyond the technological challenges at the UV level, progress is also required at the infrastructural 
level. In fact, the use of UVs, and in particular the combined use of fleets of UAVs, requires reliable 
communications bandwidth that can be provided by satellites. Therefore, sufficient bandwidth 
provided by satellites is considered an important driver for certain types of UVs (EASME, 2017). 
In addition to these technological challenges, there are certain institutional challenges to be overcome. For 
several years, a major obstacle to the setting-up of a truly European civil drone market has been the missing 
legal framework for civil drones, with consequences for the certification processes of UAV airworthiness. 
Thus far, for drones weighing less than 150 kg the EU Member States has had the responsibility to establish 
the requirements for each drone platform, while for drones above 150 kg the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) has been responsible for their certification. With the publication of the new regulation in 2019, 
the European Commission wanted to extend the scope of the EASA rules to all drones, along with putting in 
place operational requirements and procedures for certain types of drone operations. As a consequence of 
this harmonisation of the EU drones regulation, all civil drones are sorted into the three main categories — 
‘Certified’, ‘Specific’ and ‘Open’ — based on the consideration of the risks involved. The new drone regulation 
                                           
(19) As an example, the ‘Additive Manufacturing–Rapid Support System’ (AM-RS2) includes an AM unit and extended library of pre-
loaded pilot geometries of UAV systems, and components. 
(20) For example see: French, M. and Wright A. (2014): Developing mine blast resistance for composite based military vehicles. 
https://doi.org/10.1533/9781845698034.2.244. Available online 27 March 2014. 
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has been published in June 2019 to ensure drone operations across Europe are safe and secure. In contrast, 
for military UAVs specific military certifications with distinctly different legislation and regulation are 
applicable. 
The research challenges and priorities in the field of UAVs are common to both civil and military 
applications, thus providing a fertile background for synergistic opportunities. 
6.3. Key players in the unmanned aerial vehicles supply chain 
The key players in the UAVs supply chain are shown in Figure 26. China is the major supplier of more 
than 30 % of the raw materials required in UAVs, with a clear lead over South Africa, Russia and 
Europe. China is the biggest supplier of 24 of the 48 raw materials used in UAVs that have been assessed in 
this study. Europe produces only 3 % of the raw materials but is the largest producer of the 
processed materials considered relevant to UAVs with a production share of 27 %, followed by China, 
the United States and India. The United States has a healthy margin as the largest manufacturer and 
supplier of UAV components, with a market share of 42 %. The United States is followed by Japan, China 
and Europe, which together have a market share of similar size. The production of civil drones is again 
clearly dominated by Chinese companies, with an estimate of more than 75 % market share. 
Figure 27 gives an overview of the raw materials, processed materials and components required in UAVs that 
have been considered in the analysis. The country (region) shares shown in Figure 26 are estimated 
correspondingly. 
Figure 26. Unmanned aerial vehicles: key players in the supply chain of UAVs (civil applications only) 
 
Source: JRC 
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Figure 27. Unmanned aerial vehicles: an overview of raw materials, processed materials and components considered in 
the analysis 
 
Source: JRC 
6.4. Overview of supply risks for the unmanned aerial vehicles supply chain 
The estimated supply risks and bottlenecks in the supply chain for unmanned vehicles are shown in Figure 28. 
The bottleneck assessment performed has shown that the risk at the ‘raw materials’ and ‘assemblies’ 
(UAVs) supply-chain steps is potentially high. The other two steps in the supply chain, ‘processed 
materials’ and ‘components’ are at moderate risk. 
Figure 28. Overview of supply risks and bottlenecks in the supply chain for unmanned aerial vehicles 
 
Source: JRC 
6.4.1. Supply risks for unmanned aerial vehicles raw materials 
In total, 48 raw materials were identified as being relevant to UVs and analysed in the study. Europe is fully 
dependent on the supply of 40 of the 48 raw materials relevant to UV technologies. The materials 
of particular importance (with a primary production concentration of > 80 % in a single country) are REEs, Mg, 
Bi, and W, for which the dominant supplier is China, and Nb, for which the dominant supplier is Brazil. Overall, 
China provides around 32 % of the raw materials, followed by South Africa (7 %) and Russia (6 %). Similarly 
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to robotics, more than 50 % of the materials for UAVs are supplied by numerous smaller countries, which 
provides significant opportunities for supply diversification. An overview of raw materials suppliers for UAVs is 
shown in Figure 29. 
Figure 29. Raw materials suppliers for unmanned aerial vehicles: overview 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017. 
 
Twenty-three materials, namely Co, Si, C (graphite), Mg, V, Sb, Bi, REEs, Pt, Pd, B, In, Ga, Rh, Ru, Fluorspar, P, W, 
Ta, Nb, Be, Sc and Hf, are flagged as critical to the EU economy (European Commission, 2017). China is the 
predominant supplier of most of the CRMs for UVs, providing more than 40 %. South Africa and Russia are the 
next major suppliers of CRMs, with a 10 % and an 8 % share of global production respectively. The supply of 
CRMs from European countries is negligible (< 1 %) (Figure 30). 
Figure 30. Supply of CRMs for unmanned aerial vehicles: key players 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017 
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6.4.2. Supply risks for unmanned aerial vehicles processed materials 
Within the scope of this study, 14 processed materials have been selected and analysed as relevant for 
drones, namely: Al alloys, Al/Mg alloys, Mg alloys, Ni alloys, Ni/Ti alloys, Ti alloys, speciality steels, high-
performance alloys, refractory metals, composites (CFCs), aramid (Kevlar) fibres, semiconductors, 
ferroniobium and magnetic alloys. Similarly to robotics, processed materials for lithium batteries and fuel 
cells were considered in addition in the ‘processed materials’ supply-chain step (21). 
Compared to the other parts of the UAV supply chain, Europe is well positioned with regard to the 
supply of processed materials, with a share of 27 %. Other major suppliers of processed materials for 
UVs are the United States (19 %), China (17 %) and India (9 %). Other countries provide the remaining quarter 
of the processed materials. For seven of the relevant processed materials, the European share in global 
production is above 30 %, and for certain alloys Europe even dominates the global supply (Al-Mg alloys, Ti 
alloys, high-performance alloys). However, for the remaining materials, Europe’s share of global production is 
below 20 %, implying a potential need to diversify the supply sources: Europe’s share of the supply of CFCs 
and speciality steels is 16 % and 6 % respectively. For certain processed materials, Europe shows a strong 
dependency on imports due to insignificant shares of global production, namely for semiconductors, aramid 
fibres (Kevlar) and ferroniobium. For these latter processed materials, potential supply bottlenecks could 
occur. 
The country production shares of UAVs relevant processed materials are displayed in Figure 31. 
Figure 31. Country production shares of processed materials relevant to unmanned aerial vehicles 
 
Source: JRC 
6.4.3. Supply risks for unmanned aerial vehicles components 
The most important supplier by far for components for UAVs is the United States (42 %). Other 
major suppliers are Japan and China (each 14 %), and Europe (13 %). The country production shares 
for each of the components used in UAVs are shown in Figure 32. 
                                           
(21) Batteries are the current power sources of UAVs and fuel cells are considered to be potential future power sources. 
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Minor important suppliers are South Korea, Canada and Israel. The picture for the EU is very heterogeneous, 
depending on the specific types of components. The EU holds a solid share of global IMU production, 
navigation and control systems, and sensors (all > 20 %), and even dominates the global production of 
communications systems. For actuators, Europe has a market share of at least 11 %. 
However, for the other five components, the EU depends to a very high degree on foreign production. Japan is 
the key supplier of gears, sensors and fuel cells. China is the main supplier of lithium polymer (LiPo) batteries 
and a key supplier of sensors. Other key suppliers are Israel (actuators), South Korea (microprocessors and 
fuel cells) and Canada (fuel cells, IMUs, navigation and control systems). Potential supply bottlenecks are 
of concern in particular for those components the global production of which is concentrated in 
only a few countries, namely GPUs, gears, microprocessors and actuators. In particular, GPU 
production shows an extraordinary high concentration in a single country – United States (95 %). 
The country production shares of UAVs relevant components are displayed in Figure 32. 
Figure 32. Country production shares of components relevant to unmanned aerial vehicles 
 
Source: JRC 
6.4.4. Supply risks for unmanned vehicles (aerial, ground and maritime) 
As for the manufacturing of civil UAVs, China is the market leader by far, with a global market share 
above 75 %. Far behind, Europe is the second-largest supplier of civil drones (9 %), followed by the United 
States (5 %) and Israel (3 %). 
The main supplier of UGVs is the United States (46 %), followed closely by Europe (36 %). Canada 
and Israel together supply around 18 % of UGVs globally (Figure 33) (BIS Research, 2017). Similarly, the 
United States is the key supplier of UMVs (22) (35 %). United States is also the major supplier of UMVs 
(35 %). Europe is the second-largest supplier of UMVs with a share of 31 %. Canada and Japan have 
small production shares of 7 % and 5 % respectively (Unmanned Maritime Vehicles, 2013) (Figure 34). 
                                           
(22) UMVs include underwater and surface vehicles. 
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Figure 33. Country production shares of unmanned ground vehicles 
 
Source: JRC, BIS Research, 2017. 
Figure 34. Country production shares of unmanned maritime vehicles 
 
Source: JRC, Unmanned Maritime Vehicles, 2013. 
 
6.5. Civil versus military unmanned vehicle supply chains 
The comparison between civil and military UVs differs for each type of UV (aerial vehicle, ground vehicle, 
marine vehicle, etc.). There is a large area of overlap between civil and military needs, such as lightweight 
structures and high energy intensity. For UAVs, we distinguish the case of smaller UAVs from that of larger 
UAVs. For smaller UAVs, the differences between military and civil needs are often moderate. Key differences 
are the need for enhanced performance (payload, range of operation, etc.), performance under difficult 
environmental conditions and reduced vulnerability. Efforts to reduce vulnerability are focused on signature 
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control using a stealthy shape, coatings to absorb radar, heat-masking technology and decreasing the 
detectability of electronic emissions. 
Different procurement models exist for the small UAVs used by the defence sector. The easiest and cheapest 
way is often the acquisition of ordinary civil drones, which are upgraded to increase performance and/or 
signature control. Due to the rapid growth of the civil small-UAV sector, only a minority of models is 
developed for specialised military applications. For large UAVs, the civil and military supply chains are more 
separated, hindered also by the relative high unit costs. 
The key players in the production of military drones are similar to those for civil drones, but the production 
shares differ significantly. Major military drone producers are the United States (Aerovironment, 
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Dragonfly, General Atomic Aeronautical Systems) and Israel (Bluebird Aero 
Systems, Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries). European companies such as Airbus Defense and 
Space, Dassault Aviation and BAE Systems are also mentioned among the important producers of 
military drones. European companies have acted collectively to develop the next generation of armed drones, 
most notably the nEUROn UCAV technology demonstrator (in 2012) and the MALE unmanned aircraft. The 
nEUROn UCAV is the first stealth combat drone developed in Europe, and is a joint effort involving France, 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden (New America, 2019). China (China Aerospace Science and 
Technology Corporation) and South Korea (Korea Aerospace Industries) also have the capacity to 
manufacture military drones (Reuters, 2018b). 
Other countries such as India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Taiwan and Turkey have also taken steps toward 
independent armed drone production. Seeking protection against neighbouring China and Pakistan, India 
developed Rustom-I UAVs in 2009 and armed Rustom-II MALE UAVs in 2015. While Russia and Taiwan remain 
in the research and development stage, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey have succeeded in developing armed drones 
(New America, 2019). 
There is a significant overlap between the supply chains of UAVs for civil and military applications. 
For small UAVs, the first and second stages of the supply chain of these applications are almost identical, 
whereas they split for the third and fourth stages, i.e. components and assemblies. For large UAVs, this split 
might partly start earlier in the supply chain (second or even first stage). The study showed that of the 39 
UAV integrators more than 50 % produce civilian drones, only 30 % produce both civilian and military drones 
and around 20 % produce military drones only. This indicates that the integrators of both supply chains partly 
overlap, but they are mainly split between the two sectors. 
An increase in the demand for undersea warfare systems (including UUVs) is expected in the 
Asia–Pacific region (represented by China, India, Japan and South Korea) due to the rising 
tensions between the neighbouring countries and increases in defence spending. This, according to 
experts, will provide a fertile ground for a significant increase in manufacturing capacity in the Asia–Pacific 
region (Undersea Warfare Systems, 2019). 
6.6. Recommendations for policy actions and research to reduce bottlenecks in 
the unmanned aerial vehicles supply chain 
6.6.1. Recommendations at the level of raw and processed materials for unmanned 
aerial vehicles 
More than half of the relevant raw materials for UVs are supplied by multiple small suppliers, which provides 
good opportunities for supply diversification. Securing access to raw materials for which the EU has no 
significant domestic production, such as Cr, Co, Mo, C, Ni, Ti, Mg, V, Cu, Sn, Sb, Bi and Nb is essential for the 
development of this technology at EU level. An overview of raw materials suppliers for drones is shown in 
Figure 29. 
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The development of advanced manufacturing technologies for innovative lightweight and high-
strength structural and functional materials (processed materials) is a relevant research line for UVs 
due to its potential to provide significant energy-efficiency gains and environmental benefits. Candidate 
materials are advanced versions of the related lightweight alloys (magnesium alloys, aluminium alloys with 
scandium or beryllium, speciality steels) and composites (fibre reinforced), including combined polymer–metal 
composites. In addition, innovative materials for special applications are demanded, for example vanadium 
dioxide is used for miniaturised multifunctional motors (such as rotary motors) due to its suitability for 
artificial muscles (Robotics Business Review, 2019). Another striking example consists in the advancements 
due to the use of alternative alloying metals, including lithium, scandium and beryllium (IDTechEx, 2019). 
6.6.2. Recommendations at the assembly level (unmanned aerial vehicles) 
Several recommendations have been identified at the assembly level. 
— The development of smaller electronics with better performance (computation speed) is 
essential for the development of future UVs. Promotion of private–public partnerships aiming at 
maximising R & D investments. Due to the significant competitive advantage especially of the United 
States, it is recommended that a strong focus be put on key areas such as: 
 integration of alternative fuel types, also for smaller UAVs; 
 establishing a specialised semiconductor industry to support UV development; 
 establishing development communities for UAV artificial intelligence, context awareness and 
obstacle avoidance. 
— Setting up strategic alliances with non-EU countries to establish joint ventures for specific 
components identified as being critical, i.e. components that are essential for manufacturing up-to-
date UAVs and that have a highly concentrated supply. 
— Promoting common business cases and collaboration between military and civil (dual-use) 
sectors in the field of UVs to boost investment volumes. As this is promising for a distinct set of 
components only, these should first be determined. 
— Mapping and analysis of supply-chain issues for military applications, for example where 
specific corporate policies hinder the supply of components produced in the EU to the EU defence 
sector. As an example, IMU production could be investigated (Bosch, TTTech.), for example via a 
sectoral stakeholder consultation and stakeholder analysis. 
— Stimulating the deployment of a highly competitive awards-based programme that 
encourages and supports EU SME using distinct market measures such as combining SME support 
measures for scale-up and manufacturing through targeted funds, for example the European 
Defence Fund. Such programmes can lead to procurement and the development of new industrial 
capabilities, especially in speciality markets with low numbers of production units (such as research 
and defence). The European Defence Fund could provide money such a dedicated research 
programme. 
— Developing innovative software in combination with unmanned aerial systems (hardware) 
to enable the effective integration of these systems into European military forces and operations. 
6.6.3. Other policy and R & D recommendations for unmanned vehicles 
The military sector requires smaller, more economic and more efficient military drones and robots, 
which is only possible with significant technological advancements. Most often, these aims overlap with the 
R & D undertaken by the civil sector, therefore it is of great importance to make use of potential synergies 
between the civil and military sector. It is recommended that a platform be established to stimulate dual-
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use research by all European UV developers (civil and military applications), in order to strengthen the 
European UV industry. 
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7. Additive manufacturing (3D printing) 
7.1. Applications and demand for 3D printing 
The main aerospace components (potentially) manufactured using 3DP (ASTM, 2018) are grouped as follows. 
— Non-structural components. These components are predominantly made using plastic 3DP and 
include, for example, parts for the interior of aircraft. 
— Structural parts for jet engine components. This subsector is already rather mature, and notable 
examples include complex shaped components such as fuel nozzles, stator rings, turbine blades, fuel 
injectors and air ducts. 
— Other structural parts. This subsector is still under development, mainly because of strict 
homologation and fundamental technical problems for 3DP of large parts. This includes components 
such as brackets, large components including fuselage components, large metallic structures such as 
aircraft wings and empennage (EASME, 2016; AM-motion, 2018). 
In total, 17 individual raw materials in five processed material families are identified as being those most 
relevant to 3DP and analysed in the study for both civil and military aerospace. The most common alloy 
families are powders of aluminium-magnesium, titanium, nickel, stainless steel and special alloys 
(EPMA, 2018). Various titanium alloys, such as those with aluminium and vanadium (grade 5) elements, are 
used for high-strength and lightweight applications. They are corrosion resistant, can be heat treated and are 
relatively expensive. A more pure variant (grade 23) is used for brackets, sandwich structures with carbon 
fibre reinforced plastics, in vanes and in support structures. Relatively pure alloys (grade 2) are also used in 
space applications, such as for antennas, and are very stiff and light. Compressor disks and blades used in 
both military and civil applications are made with aluminium-molybdenum-zirconium-containing titanium 
alloys. Various titanium-aluminium-niobium-containing alloys are used for additional high-rigidity-at-high-
temperatures properties for jet engines, blades, valves and rotors, including for example in Genx and LEAP 
engines for civil aircraft. According to Safran (Viguier, 2018), titanium-based alloys have a great future as 
lighter parts, and higher-temperature resistance reduces fuel consumption and emissions. Titanium alloys are 
also galvanically compatible with more use of carbon fibre reinforced plastics, and titanium powders for 
3DP could be extensively used, if they reach ‘affordable’ market prices. 
3DP potentially allows for a very wide variety of both civil and military applications. The new 
technology offers specific advantages for aerospace in general and for defence (Objectify, 2019; BCG, 
2018), in particular for the following. 
— Prototyping and design freedom. 3DP can significantly improve product development and allows 
substantially more design freedom compared to traditional manufacturing. Examples in aerospace 
include components with complex geometries and performance requirements, such as fuel nozzles 
(General Electrics (United States), Rolls-Royce (United Kingdom) and Pratt & Whitney (United States)), 
stator rings, fuel injectors (Morris Technologies), air ducts (Boeing fighters) and parts in helicopter 
engines (Safran Helicopters), including key parts inside the combustion chamber. These 3D-printed-
component-containing engines are almost 30 % more powerful than those previously manufactured. 
Another example is a Pratt & Whitney engine containing 12 3DP parts mounted on Bombardier 
aircraft. The components are mainly fasteners and injection nozzles, 3D-printed in titanium and 
nickel alloys. 
— Lightweight parts. 3DP allows for substantial weight reduction through the optimised design of a 
wide range of parts and the combination of multiple parts into single ones. Examples include fuel 
tanks, engine nacelles, hinges and brackets. The use of 3DP in the previous example of Pratt & 
Whitney engines has saved a total of almost 15 months over the entire design process, and the final 
weight of the part has come out at 50 % less than a conventional equivalent. For structural parts, 
key players are Airbus, Rolls-Royce, Snecma and AvioAereo. STELIA Aerospace has produced a 
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demonstration 3D-printed reinforced fuselage panel using wire and arc additive manufacturing 
technology (Bikas et al., 2016) of 1 square meter. 
— Customisation. 3DP enables the serialised production of unique parts with fewer design restrictions 
and high customisation potential. Other instances include customised protection gear, connectors for 
missiles and a variety of parts for satellites. Various examples exist that are produced by Stratasys 
and Airbus. For non-structural parts such as civil aircraft interiors, 3DP offers customisation potential 
for small production numbers when different airlines have specific demands. 3DP has the possibility 
to create small production numbers without expensive tooling needs for each individual airline. The 
same potential is there for defence purposes, with equally low production numbers for a wide variety 
of parts and expensive tooling as well. 
— Field operations support/maintenance and repair. 3DP can also be used to repair existing parts. 
Hybrid technologies combining conventional machining, and especially DED-type technologies, are 
intensively studied for aerospace and military applications. 3DP is an enabler of more flexible 
production capacity in the field. It provides immediate production, reducing complex and costly 
logistics relevant to defence. It also allows for direct repair and alterations where needed, supporting 
strategic, tactical planning and troop field support. For defence, examples include documented repairs 
of components of F35B and F22A fighter jets that would otherwise have been grounded much 
longer. In one case the parts produced are even manufactured for permanent replacement. In combat 
situations, being able to quickly restore a fighter aircraft is a valuable asset. 
— For isolated operations in particular, 3DP allows the production of highly tailored products or 
simplified short-term replacement and repair parts that were originally based on other materials. 
Examples include 3D printers on navy vessels that are able to print a variety of parts after 3D 
scanning of the original objects and, as an ultimate example, the installation of a 3D printer on the 
International Space Station in 2014. 
7.2. Technological challenges for 3D printing 
3DP is maturing rapidly (Statista, 2019b). However, key challenges identified for 3DP are achieving 
sufficient quality, lower production cost and consistency in production, in particular to meet 
aerospace certification, as well as military performance demands (AM-motion, 2018; DefenceIQ, 2016). 
— Quality constraints. Aerospace restrictions for certification and quality control reduce the 
‘continuous improvement’ potential of 3DP in particular. Lowering safety-related legislative barriers 
is clearly not an option for aerospace. Hence, 3DP as a technology needs to become more mature 
regarding quality and reproducibility. 
— Just-in-time and fast manufacturing is another challenge. The high cost of equipment, raw 
materials, slow printing times and the limited sizes of powder beds are concerns relating to the 
production of larger parts. With the significant need for more maturity, rapid improvements are being 
observed in this area. 
— Another area for improvement is the quality and finishing of parts. Specific needs are indicated 
for non-destructive testing (NDT) and other certifications dedicated to metal 3DP-produced parts for 
aerospace applications. 
7.3. Key players in the 3D-printing supply chain 
This analysis focuses on the same steps in the value chain as considered for the other technologies. However, 
3DP is a specific case in the context of this report compared to the other four technologies analysed. 3DP as a 
technology is both consuming materials to manufacture the 3D printers themselves, as well as for the 
production of parts by using the technology. The latter has by far the largest impact on the demand for 
materials. At the same time, 3DP allows for reduction, substitution, recycling and mitigation in the use 
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of CRMs and traditionally manufactured components. This mitigation strategy is particularly relevant to 
defence applications in resource-constraint situations and/or remote locations in order to keep 
aerospace platforms operational. 
The key players in the 3DP supply chain are shown in Figure 35. China is the major supplier of around 
30 % of the raw materials required in 3DP and the largest supplier of seven of the 17 raw 
materials relevant to 3DP. South Africa and Brazil are other key suppliers of raw materials. For the other 
two stages, however, Europe has strong metallurgical capabilities relating to the supply of 
processed materials (55 % production share), in particular for nickel alloys, stainless steels and special 
alloys. Europe also has a relatively strong position in the development and supply of 3DP systems 
(production share of 34 %). 
In Figure 36, an overview is given of the raw materials, processed materials and different AM metal systems 
that have been considered in the analysis. The country (region) shares shown in Figure 35 are estimated 
correspondingly. 
Figure 35. Additive manufacturing (3DP): key players in the supply chain 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 36. Additive manufacturing (3DP): an overview of raw materials, processed materials and AM systems considered 
in the analysis 
 
Source: JRC 
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7.4. Overview of supply risks for the 3D-printing supply chain 
Due to the nature of 3DP, the number of supply-chain stages between (non-conventional) materials and 
finished components will be significantly reduced in the future. Many materials used for conventional 
manufacturing are traded in established commodity markets. For 3DP in comparison, there is a lack of 
(standardisation of) established powder recipes. This aspect is highly relevant for guaranteeing part quality 
and reproducibility, and thus the certification of aerospace components. The cooperation of the 3D-printer 
suppliers and powder providers creates a more direct relation between processed materials for 3DP 
and the actual technology used. This affects both the supply risk and the competitiveness of 
manufacturing. Both will increasingly rely on these specific materials–technology interfaces. 
Similarly to the other technologies, Figure 37 shows the main bottlenecks in the supply chain based on the 
above analysis. The bottleneck assessment performed has shown that there is a potential high risk 
of supply issues for the raw materials step only, and a medium supply risk for the last step of the 
supply chain (supply of AM metal systems) mainly due to expected rapid growth in demand (Figure 
37). 
Figure 37. Overview of supply risks and bottlenecks in the supply chain of 3DP 
 
Source: JRC 
 
7.4.1. Supply risks for 3D-printing raw materials 
When elaborating on the supply risks and the expected increase in demand for materials for 3DP, the specific 
demands for dual-use applications relate to the materials present in aluminium-magnesium, titanium, nickel, 
stainless steel and special alloys. These five main alloy families contain eight CRMs, namely cobalt, 
magnesium, vanadium, hafnium, tungsten, scandium, silicon metal and niobium. The demand for 
titanium- and nickel-based AM powders is expected to rise sharply. Recently however, trade sanctions and 
tariffs for titanium are recognised as being a particular threat both to the supply and to the cost levels for 
the aerospace industry. 
An overview of raw materials suppliers for 3DP is presented in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38. Raw materials suppliers for 3DP: overview 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017. 
 
The key suppliers of CRMs for 3DP are shown in Figure 39. Five of the eight CRMs (European Commission, 
2017) identified for 3DP, namely magnesium, vanadium, tungsten, scandium and silicon metal, are supplied 
from China. Other key suppliers of CRMs are Brazil and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The supply of 
3DP-relevant CRMs from European countries is negligible (< 1 %). 
Figure 39. Supply of CRMs for 3DP technology: key players 
 
Source: European Commission, 2017. 
 
Other materials relevant to dual-use 3DP applications in aerospace are chromium, copper and manganese, 
which are used as alloying elements to enhance various alloy properties. Scandium, niobium and 
hafnium (a by-product of zirconium) are materials used in special alloys for lightweight and high-
temperature applications, and therefore are more specifically related to defence and space applications. 
Scandium is used in expensive aluminium-scandium alloys providing impressively lightweight and strong 
structures. Scandium has a very low total global production volume compared to almost all other metals, and 
primarily originates from China (66 %). Hafnium is used in expensive (3D metal powder) nickel-based 
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super alloys in turbine blades, vanes and industrial gas turbines. The supply-and-demand balance of Hafnium 
is known to be very volatile. Another non-3D-printed military application of hafnium is in nuclear control rods 
in reactors and submarines. Niobium is used in the production of high-strength low-alloy steels and in 
stainless steels for increased resistance to corrosion and high temperatures. This also includes the more 
common stainless steel 718, with significant quantities of niobium typically used where corrosion resistance 
and high strength at high operating temperatures are sought. These alloys are used in the nuclear industry in 
nuclear reactor components, and in the space industry in rocket thruster nozzles. A number of different 
niobium-containing alloy types (C-129, C-3009 and some titanium-niobium) are identified as being relevant 
to specialised 3DP applications for both civil and military aerospace. Niobium primarily originates from 
Brazil (95 %). 
7.4.2. Supply risks for 3D-printing processed materials 
Contrary to the results of a previous study (EASME, 2016), Europe seems well positioned to provide 
metallurgical and transformative capacities for the production of 3DP powders. The analysis is 
based on the data from 63 suppliers of powders and wire that have been identified and scrutinised here. This 
applies in particular to steel- and nickel-based alloys. However, Europe is less represented in aluminium 
and titanium powders (more dominated by the United States and Canada) and appears to have a 
gap in the supply chain in the case of metal-wire products. The latter proved to be difficult to 
document, but it is suspected that these metal wires primarily originate from China as well. This may affect 
future abilities for the 3DP of large structural parts. 
The country production shares for processed materials relevant to 3DP that were considered in the supply 
chain analysis are shown in Figure 40. Shares are based on the number of suppliers per material. 
Figure 40. Country production shares of processed materials relevant to 3DP  
 
Source: JRC 
 
The main concern about the supply chain is the fact that most of the commercially used 3DP technologies are 
rigid in terms of input-processing variables. Hence, it is difficult to customise powder compositions 
according to the end user’s needs. As with the business model of traditional printing, many commercially 
available metal powders are supplied by the 3D machine providers, and their costs are relatively high. The 
lack of flexibility in the recipes available for different machines has an impact on costs, as well 
as the quality and consistency of the produced parts. 
Despite Europe having a large share of the supply, there are supply concerns. The reason is that there are 
only a small number of metal-powder suppliers identified in total. Any supply disruptions in one of 
these early material-production stages are likely to have immediate and severe impacts on the 
availability of a wide range of components. It should be noted that the number of players, market 
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shares and ownerships of powder producers and 3DP systems is changing quickly in this rapidly maturing 
sector. 
7.4.3. Supply risks for 3D-printing components 
In the later stages of the supply chain, Europe is relatively well represented. The civil plus military 
aerospace sector is marked by a very high level of concentration around key original equipment 
manufacturers. 3DP suppliers and integrators such as Boeing and GE (United States) are known for vertical 
steering, taking the lead on key developments. In Europe, Airbus is steering its supply chain more horizontally 
in this direction. Nearly all major aerospace original equipment manufacturers, including Bell Helicopter, GKN 
Aerospace, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, MTU Aero Engines, Northrop Grumman, Pratt & Whitney, Raytheon, 
and Rolls-Royce, have built infrastructures within their corporations to evaluate and implement 3DP 
technologies. 
7.4.4. Supply risks for 3D-printing systems 
For 3DP systems, information is identified on the total unit shipments for each country from 2007 to 2017, 
along with a detailed list of all identified suppliers (Wohlers, 2018). Rapid growth is observed in the number of 
manufacturers providing polymer and/or metal 3DP industrial machines. On the basis of total units sold, 
Europe has a market share of about 20 %, and the United States and Israel represent over 71 % of the 
supply. This US share is predominantly in polymer-based systems, which have the largest share in units 
produced. When analysing the number of manufacturers of metal 3DP machines the EU is slightly better 
represented, as illustrated in Figure 41. 
Figure 41. Shares based on the number of units sold between 2007 and 2017 for polymer systems (left); and the number 
of metal-based 3D printer systems (right) 
  
Source: JRC, Wohlers, 2018. 
When analysing in more detail per technology, the Europe’s share in the number of suppliers is 25 % and 
21 % respectively for the two key sub-technologies, PBF and DED, compared to the total of 32 % for all metal 
3DP technologies combined. China has a high and quickly growing number of individual suppliers, though so 
far with relatively low unit shipments. 
Regarding software enabling 3DP (Busachi et al., 2018), we need to distinguish product-design software such 
as ProE and Solidworks (US-based) and CATIA (EU-based), from software converting drawings for the actual 
manufacturing process and post-processing software. In general the United States is more advanced here, but 
European companies are also well represented (AM-motion, 2018).  
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7.5. Civil versus military 3D-printing supply chains 
The metal-based 3DP manufacturing sector clearly has both a military and civil aerospace aspect, 
characterised by both a very high level of innovation and complex safety, security and endurance 
requirements for the parts produced. Due to rapid developments, it is not possible to provide quantitative 
numbers on the precise market shares and volumes at stake. Therefore, the quantitative approach of this 
study identified the geographical locations and development of the supply chain stages, rather than the 
tonnages produced or economic market shares. 
The similarities between 3DP for civil applications and that for military applications originate from the same 
difficult operating environments and high levels of investment required. They involve common players and 
share similar technical concerns. Most of the integrators, such as Airbus and Boeing, have both civil and 
military applications. Hence, their supply chains have many overlaps. However, due to more recent 
investments, the centre of gravity in innovation lies more on the civil side than on the more conservative and 
secured military side of the supply chains. For civil applications, a large share of EU research and 
development occurs at small suppliers and SMEs, rather than at large system integrators and aircraft 
manufacturers. One reason is that, over the last several years, commercial aerospace has been doing rather 
well macroeconomically, whereas defence budgets and subsequently R & D investment in new technologies 
like 3DP have been more constrained. As a consequence, the use of 3DP in the defence sector is more 
anecdotal. The sector is not yet thoroughly incorporating the technology in its manufacturing 
processes, and thus is not yet exploiting the full potential offered by 3DP (EDA, 2018). 
Vertical integration versus collaboration in the value chain. One of the particularities of the aerospace 
3DP value chain is that integrators and assembly producers seem to be moving along the value chain. As a 
tentative conclusion, in Europe integration appears to take place more horizontally in the form of 
partnerships, with Airbus stimulating innovation in its suppliers and SMEs. Inside and outside the 
United States, GE in particular is arranging for a fair amount of vertical integration in acquiring powder 
suppliers, equipment manufacturers, software enterprises and production companies, leading to the largest 
installed machine base worldwide and covering the entire value chain. It is not possible to state which 
strategy is better: The EU approach is not necessarily better or worse than the United States one. It is a 
matter of balance between more control and more flexibility. It is nevertheless a point for further 
research to characterise the effect of possible supply disruptions for both strategies. 
7.6. Recommendations for policy actions and research to reduce bottlenecks in 
the 3D-printing supply chain 
7.6.1. Recommendations at the level of raw and processed materials for 3D printing 
A key policy action resulting from the analysis is steering towards the diversification of current raw 
material extraction to reduce the current dependency on a few countries for certain materials. For 3DP, this 
applies specifically to titanium, cobalt, magnesium, vanadium, tungsten and niobium. Improving 
relations and mining conditions under the scope of new trade agreements with, for instance, Australia and 
Canada is of particular relevance here.  
An improved strategic understanding of the resilience of the military supply chains is needed. The 
(future) role of 3DP in the critical sectors of aerospace and defence warrants careful reconsideration of 
specific strategies to mitigate supply risks. Creating strategic stockpiles for manufacturing of the 
main 3DP powders can be reconsidered (RPA, 2012). Here, 3DP powders identified in the background report 
include titanium grade 2, grade 5 and grade 23, Al-10Si-Mg, Al07Si-0.6Mg, nickel alloys 316L and 625, 
stainless steel alloy 718; CoCr and possibly specific zirconium and niobium alloys. 
Here, specific R & D actions are recommended that can, for example, be embedded in research on advanced 
materials for the future. For 3DP this includes specific investigations into the balance between the technical 
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advantages of the use of scandium, niobium, hafnium and zirconium in special alloys as advanced materials, 
along with their raw material supply risks and very specific mining and refining conditions, which are not as 
yet well documented. 
Another strategy to consider is to strengthen the protection of specialised SMEs producing 3DP powders in 
Europe against hostile foreign takeover. Further analyses of the costs and benefits of both these 
mitigation strategies should be related to the risk for the defence sector of not being able to keep 
aerospace platforms operational, and the risk for the civil sector of not being able to keep aircraft 
production uninterrupted and competitive. 
7.6.2. Recommendations at the assembly level (3D-printing systems) 
For wire products for the production of larger parts, Europe is ahead in the related DED technology 
development. At the same time, Europe seems to suffer from a poor supply chain for metal wires. From an 
R & D perspective, it is recommended that the lack of customisation capabilities between the processed 
materials used and the specific 3DP technology developed should be further investigated. Specific attention 
must be paid to the availability of high-quality, environmentally friendly and cost-effective materials, 
depending on the individual application. Europe’s AM community relies on a limited selection of 
conventional feedstock materials, and the range of available high-quality materials needs to be 
expanded. 
7.6.3. Other policy and R & D recommendations for 3D printing 
Three other main areas for possible action are identified, related to technology development, 
standardisation, safety and the protection/valorisation of IPRs for 3DP (AM-motion, 2018). 
— Technology development 
The aforementioned technological limitations are not expected to remain for long: the high speed of 
development will provide more capable machines and quality materials for each part of the market, 
including the military section with its high performance demands. The patent analysis confirms this 
development pace. In the past around half of the patents were related to processed materials. In recent years 
patents related to technology alone prevail. The analysis shows that globally there is a great deal of 
research being done on overcoming the current disadvantages of metal 3DP. The highest growth rates 
in patents in over the past several years is observed for the United States, China, the EU and Japan, as shown 
in Figure 42. More information can be found in the related background report (MatDual, 2019). 
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Figure 42. Variation in patent applications related to 3DP 
 
Source: JRC, European Patent Office 
The domain of 3DP for the repair and maintenance of equipment seems of particular relevance for the 
defence sector, for example for operations in remote locations. Currently, this domain is poorly documented 
and requires further analysis and R & D effort. 
— Standardisation and certification; safety 
In this respect there is a clear need for standardisation of metal powders and wire recipes for AM. With 
EU companies and SMEs being well positioned to produce high-quality components, the standardisation of 
3DP material recipes would assist EU companies in particular. The preference of the aerospace industry itself 
is to have a stable and international standardisation process involving European and international bodies (AM-
motion, 2018; DefenceIQ, 2016). With regard to the pace of Chinese research and development seemingly 
being much faster than that of the EU, it is recommended that targeted research and innovation actions be 
funded in this technical domain. 
For the 3DP-relevant materials under REACH, nickel is restricted for certain uses related to skin contact. 
Cobalt, magnesium, niobium and tungsten are registered under REACH, but their specific properties may 
trigger more demand rather than more substitution in the future. For 3DP, the powders of these metals in 
particular need to be further investigated regarding safe handling and proper removal and recycling 
from powder beds. This can lead to higher handling costs for additive manufacturing in Europe. 
— Digital security and IPR protection 
Protection of intellectual property (IP) is a key piece in the broader framework of competition policy. This 
applies in particular to 3DP as an emerging technology. In military and dual-use sectors, protection against 
foreign hostile takeover of SMEs should be improved to prevent security-related technologies and IP 
from being captured by others. Europe is particularly strong in innovation in metal-based AM. This further 
requires, on the one hand, special attention to be paid to the functioning of IP regimes to protect 
developed copyright. On the other hand, strategies need to be developed that foster the valorisation of 
new 3DP capabilities in a fair manner. 
A particular area of IP concern is the protection of information provided with or within CAD files. Here 
the creation of a suitable IP framework that clarifies the implications of 3DP in relation to original designs is 
recommended, in particular for components with a military purpose (AM-motion, 2018). 
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A variety of actions are proposed in relation to materials research, manufacturing capabilities and 
coordination and support needs. These include the following. 
— Improving standardisation to promote high quality and consistency, and lowering the costs of AM 
powders. The same goes for the development of standards and quality-assurance systems, in 
particular for finishing, testing and certification steps after parts manufacturing. 
— The role and necessities for AM to recycle parts and unused powders, including guidelines for 
maintaining or restoring material properties. 
— Developing a knowledge repository of materials and process parameters. 
— Identifying powder properties for the quality and consistency of powder production. 
— Developing new sustainable materials and processes and related characterisation in the field of 
multifunctional materials, multi-materials and materials with highly improved functionality for 
aerospace applications, in particular for special alloys used in defence and space such as niobium, 
hafnium/zirconium and scandium. 
— Increasing the size of the production envelope for larger airframe structures using AM technologies. 
— Improving safety assessment, safety management and guidelines and education on environmental 
health and safety challenges with AM, in particular for the handling of metal powders and their 
unique properties. 
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8. Conclusions 
Study findings 
Rapid growth in demand of between 10 % and more than 30 % is expected over the short and medium term 
for the five technologies examined here. Securing adequate and continuous access to raw and processed 
materials, and components, is of the utmost importance for the competitiveness of European industry. 
The dependence of Europe on the supply of raw materials for the five analysed technologies is 
extremely high. Europe produces on average around 3 % of the overall raw materials required in Li-ion 
batteries, fuel cells, robotics, UAVs and 3DP technologies (Figure 43). China dominates global production, 
supplying around one third of the raw materials. Other key suppliers are South Africa (7  %) and Russia (4 %). 
Brazil, Australia and Chile are also shown to be key suppliers for 3DP and Li-ion batteries. More than half of 
the raw materials are produced by numerous small suppliers with minor shares of global production (<4 %). 
Figure 43. Key suppliers of raw materials, processed materials, components and assemblies for Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, 
robotics, UAVs and additive manufacturing (3DP) technologies 
 
Source: JRC 
Europe supplies only 1 % of the CRMs required in the five technologies in question. The major 
supplier is China, with a share of almost 40 %, followed by South Africa (9 %), Russia (6 %) and 
many smaller suppliers (Figure 44). 
Figure 44. Key suppliers of CRMs for Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, UAVs and additive manufacturing (3DP) 
 
Source: JRC, European Commission, 2017. 
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Figure 45. Critical materials required in Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, UAVs and additive manufacturing (3DP) 
 
Source: JRC 
In total, 23 CRMs have been identified as necessary for Li-ion batteries, fuel cells/hydrogen technologies, 
robotics, drones and 3DP technologies. The main CRMs at risk are cobalt, used in all five technologies, and 
natural graphite, magnesium, silicon metal and vanadium, used in four of the five technologies. Most of the 
critical materials are used in three of the technologies (Figure 45). 
Critical materials and REACH. Nine of the CRMs are registered in REACH, namely antimony (Sb), beryllium 
(Be), cobalt (Co), graphite, magnesium (Mg), niobium (Nb), cerium (Ce), neodymium (Nd) and tungsten (W) 
(ECHA, 2013). These substances of concern need to be progressively replaced by suitable alternatives in 
future. The enforcement of REACH is a Member State obligation, and therefore they are taking care of this. 
Member States may allow for exemptions from REACH in specific cases for certain substances, on their own, 
in a mixture or in an article, where necessary in the interest of defence (Article 2.3 of REACH). The European 
Defence Agency is also working on this issue, and information can be found in EDA (2019). The line between 
defence and civil protection (e.g. police, firefighters) is sometimes difficult to draw, and goods used for 
defence are used for civil purposes. But civil protection material may also be used for defence purposes. 
Another piece of chemical legislation (classification, labelling and packaging) is following the same route as 
REACH in the defence sector. 
With regard to the use of non-critical materials that might merit further attention in future, the study has 
found that 6 materials are extensively used in all five technologies, namely Al, Cu, Mn, Ni, Ti and Fe; while four 
materials, namely Li, Cr, Mo and Zr are required in at least 4 of the examined technologies (Figure 46). 
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Figure 46 Non-critical materials required in at least four of the five technologies: Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, UAVs 
and additive manufacturing (3DP) 
 
Source: JRC 
With the exception of Li-ion batteries, Europe is generally an important supplier of processed 
materials for the five technologies, providing, on average, about one third (Figure 43). Other key suppliers 
are the United States (20 %), China (19 %) and Japan (8 %). Canada, India and South Korea are shown to be 
key suppliers for 3DP, robotics and Li-ion batteries. 
Though a strong player in the production of processed materials, Europe is highly dependent on the supply of 
certain materials, such as aramid fibre, semiconductors, ferroniobium and processed materials for Li-ion 
batteries (main supplier China). Such dependencies apply to both the civil and the defence sectors. Europe 
also relies, to a lesser degree, on the supply of nanomaterials, specific Al alloys and speciality steels. 
In terms of component supply, with the exception of fuel cell technology, Europe’s domestic 
production of components is relatively low. Europe produces, on average, around 12 % of the 
components required in Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics and drones (Figure 43). A key issue for 
batteries is the lack of EU capacity in Li-ion cell component manufacturing (cathodes, anodes, electrolytes and 
separators) and in cell manufacturing itself. There is high dependence on China for both. Although the 
European share in Li-ion cell production is expected to increase, thanks to the European strategic action plan 
for batteries adopted in 2018, Li-ion batteries for common military applications are still assembled from 
commercial cells manufactured in Asia. China is also a major supplier (80 %) of the REE magnets used in 
robots and drones for both civil and defence applications. The main concern of EU industry for robotics and 
UAVs is the lack of EU component manufacturers, with the United States leading the supply of actuators, 
controllers (processors), GPUs and IMUs, while Japan dominates the supply of high-precision gears. Overall, 
the key suppliers of components resulting from the analysis are the United States (fuel cells, robotics, drones), 
China (Li-ion batteries, robotics, drones), Japan (Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, drones), Canada (fuel 
cells) and South Korea (Li-ion batteries). 
Europe produces, on average, around 17 % of Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, drones and 3D metal 
systems globally (Figure 43). Europe is a strong player in the production of robots and 3D metal 
systems. It has some production of drones, though not enough to satisfy its needs (assuming European 
demand is around 20-25 % of global demand, as observed for other established technologies). Europe is 
very weak as regards the supply of Li-ion and LiPo batteries and fuel cells, which are 
predominantly provided by Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) and North America (United States 
and Canada). Japanese manufacturers dominate industrial robotics, while United States manufacturers 
dominate non-industrial robotics, UVs and artificial intelligence. Manufacturers in the United States are also 
the key players for military exoskeletons. The United States and China dominate UAV assembly and UAV 
manufacturing. Regarding 3D printers for industrial use, the United States leads in polymer-based 
technologies, with Europe strongly present in metal AM. For aerospace applications, the United States and the 
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EU are equally present in the top 15 system integrators, exploring and driving the development of 3DP on a 
large scale. 
The role of China as a key supplier in the supply chains is worthy of note. It has acquired, and continues to 
expand its dominant position in the Li-ion battery and drone supply chains, and has ambitious plans in the 
fields of robotics, fuel cells and 3DP. 
The analysis shows that the weakest step in the supply chain for the five technologies under investigation is 
the supply of raw materials. Furthermore, the supply of assemblies appears to be very critical for three of the 
technologies, namely Li-ion batteries, fuel cells and drones. The supply of processed materials is shown to be 
critical for Li-ion batteries, though some supply risks are also detected for robotics and drones. At components 
level, though some supply risks are detected for Li-ion batteries and drones, robotics seems to be the most 
vulnerable technology (Figure 47). 
Figure 47. Supply risks identified for Europe in the supply chains of Li-ion batteries, fuel cells, robotics, UAVs and 3DP 
 
Source: JRC 
Some general cross-cutting issues identified in the analysis are related to sensors and software 
development skills. Sensors will become ever more important, and their development and the processing of 
their data should receive close attention. Software development skills will be a key enabler for the 
development of robotic and autonomous systems for both European military forces and civil applications. 
 
General policy recommendations 
It is important that European industry is preserved, organised and supported in order to reduce Europe’s 
strategic dependency and increase security of supply via diversification, especially with regard to the 
supply of raw materials and components, both of which are shown as weak links in the supply chains. 
Besides increasing domestic production, other suggested strategies include the substitution of 
critical materials, recycling and finding alternative suppliers. In addition to reducing the demand for 
primary materials of limited supply, recycling can also reduce production costs, save energy, lessen resource 
consumption and diminish our environmental impact. However, it remains a challenge to develop a cost-
effective, environmentally friendly recycling process with high recycling efficiency (23), which produces cleaner, 
higher-quality recycled materials. This needs attention, in terms of both research and policymaking. 
                                           
(23) The Chromic EU project will develop new processes to recover chromium, vanadium, molybdenum and niobium from industrial 
waste. 
74 
Another important aspect is that the security of supply with regard to material dependence should be 
always examined in a value-chain approach, taking into account the linkages between various value-
chain steps. The study advances this point by investigating the raw materials, processed and advanced 
materials, components and assemblies required for five strategic emerging technologies. The collection of 
reliable data for processed materials, and often for components, has been identified as an issue that merits 
further attention. 
The EU’s dependency on raw materials goes beyond physical access to the individual minerals, and is affected 
by other economic conditions related to mining conditions, ownership, trade restrictions, environmental 
permitting and other uneven conditions. Industries outside the EU are typically less concerned with responsible 
sourcing, potentially causing an uneven playing field. This is undermining social and environmental conditions 
in developing countries. Securing sustainable access to the right quantity and quality of raw 
materials will be key to future responsible EU industry developments. 
The study also highlights the need for more effective action on (critical) raw materials in Europe. 
Such actions can tackle supply risks at any step in the supply chain, such as joint procurement, promoting 
recycling and substitution, among others. Supply diversification, via trade agreements or tailor-made 
trade contracts with different supplier countries, could decrease the threat of supply shortages. Such a 
contract would secure the supply from a certain country, giving the supplying country planning reliability (a 
win-win situation). Stockpiling could be one of the options to mitigate short- to medium-term supply 
disruptions in the event of a crisis. Different stockpiling options could be examined at EU or Member State 
level, supporting corporate strategies to mitigate risks. A dedicated study could be commissioned to evaluate 
and analyse in more depth the potential of stockpiling materials essential to the development of certain 
technologies, along with the environmental, social and economic impacts, taking into account the expected 
technological developments of the future. 
In order to tackle the extremely high dependence of Europe on the supply of raw materials this study 
identified the need for more cooperative and effective action on securing the supply of (critical) raw 
materials. In order to do so, distinct measures are identified by this report, which require as a basis the 
permanent monitoring of raw materials markets and (strategic) value chains. It also puts in 
evidence the need for industry and policymakers to work together and to ensure access to up-to-date 
reliable information for the Member States and stakeholders (e.g. as done in the Raw Materials 
Information System) in relation to the most critical CRMs. The exchange of data and information, and 
international cooperation, should be supported in an integrated manner at the EU, Member State 
and corporate levels. The above could be of great support to strategic sectors, including the dual-use and 
defence sectors, thus supporting the development of a coherent EU CRM policy. 
Lastly, inclusive, strategic and comprehensive discussions are needed on the role and future 
competitiveness of these emerging technologies — particularly on material availability, sustainability, 
IPR protection, software development and digital security for key military and civil supply chains. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Methodology and data 
In order to identify forthcoming bottlenecks in the supply chains of the five technologies selected for this 
study, a tailored methodology was developed and applied. In this dedicated methodology, the materials 
supply issues and potential bottlenecks in the supply chain for the five dual-use technologies (battery cells, 
fuel cells, robots, drones and AM systems) are assessed using several parameters for each step of the supply 
chain: raw materials, processed materials, components and assemblies. For each step, several parameters 
were taken into account that might weaken or jeopardise sustainable supply in Europe (Figure 48). 
Figure 48. Parameters used in assessing the potential bottlenecks in the supply chain 
 
Source: JRC 
 
Six parameters are used to evaluate the potential supply risks at the level of raw materials, namely: (1) global 
supply risk; (2) European production (domestic supply); (3) criticality factor (whether a material is flagged as 
critical in the 2017 CRM list); (4) import reliance of Europe for a particular raw material; (5) substitution; and 
(6) recycling. The import reliance, substitution and recycling parameters are assessed using data from the 
2017 CRM study. For steps 2, 3 and 4 in the supply chain, two parameters are used: (1) global supply risk; and 
(2) European production (domestic supply). The global supply risk for all steps has been determined using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), based on concentration of supply. The European domestic supply 
corresponds to the European shares determined during the supply-chain analysis. An additional parameter — 
demand trends — is considered at the last step in the supply chain, indicating demand increases forecast for 
the future. 
The indicators are normalised in the range of 0 to 1; lower values indicate a relatively higher degree of supply 
risk. The results are presented visually in the form of a traffic-light matrix. The following two marginal cases 
are distinguished. 
— Red area (corresponding to value 0), indicating a very high supply risk and the presence of 
substantial supply issues combined with a limited ability to adapt or tackle them due to the nature of 
the impact/risk. 
— Green area (corresponding to value 1), indicating the best case scenario, or no detectable supply 
issues. 
Intermediate values, represented by yellow, orange or various intensities of green, indicate that a potential 
supply issue/risk is detectable with medium to low confidence. The relationship between colour, score scale, 
risk scale and bottlenecks is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Relationship between given scores, colours and bottlenecks 
Colour Score Risk scale Bottlenecks 
 0-0.2 Very high (VH) Existence of severe bottlenecks in the supply chain and the presence of 
other significant factors, negatively influencing the supply combined with 
limited ability to adapt due to the nature of the supply risk 
 0.2-0.4 High (H) Presence of severe and widespread bottlenecks in the materials supply 
chain 
 0.4-0.6 Medium (M) Bottlenecks are detectable which can affect the supply at medium 
confidence 
 0.6-0.8 Low (L) Bottlenecks are hardly perceptible and if they exist, they have low impact 
on the supply risk 
 0.8-1 Undetectable 
(U) 
No bottlenecks are detectable which would weaken the security of 
supply 
The materials identified for each technology contribute to each parameter with an equal weight through an 
arithmetic mean before being combined and scaled from 0 to 1. 
More details about the parameters used for evaluation of the potential bottlenecks and materials/ 
components/ assemblies supply risks are given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Definition of the parameters used in the bottlenecks assessment 
Indicator Description Supply chain step 
Global supply risk Calculated using a metric of market concentration (known as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)  
All four steps in the 
supply chain 
European domestic 
supply 
Estimated European supply as a share of the global supply, scaled from 
0 to 1 (*). 
All four steps in the 
supply chain 
Criticality factor Whether or not a raw material is flagged as a critical material in the 
2017 CRM list. The score given is 0 if critical and 1 if non-critical. 
Step 1: raw materials 
Import reliance The European import reliance as estimated in the 2017 CRM study, 
scaled from 0 to 1. 
Step 1: raw materials 
Substitution Represents substitution index in relation to the supply risk (SISR) as 
defined in the 2017 CRM study.  
Step 1: raw materials 
Recycling Refers to the end-of-life recycling input rate (EOL-RIR) as provided by 
the 2017 CRM study, scaled from 0 to 1. 
Step 1: raw materials 
Demand trends Takes into account the technology uptake forecast in the short and 
medium term (by 2030); lower values correspond to high expected 
uptake rates.  
Step 4: assemblies 
(*) It is assumed that 30 % domestic production could satisfy European needs, considering that European demand is around 20-25 % of 
global demand (assumption based on data from different energy sectors). Therefore, European production of 30 % or higher is considered 
safe (= 1); production shares of less than 30 % are scaled down accordingly. 
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This methodology is meant to give an indication of whether or not the selected dual-use technologies are 
susceptible to supply issues and where in the supply chain these shortages might be expected. Thus, it allows 
us to identify where in the supply chain intervention is needed. 
 
Methodology robustness check regarding using companies’ headquarter location 
The calculation of the supply shares for the raw materials step is rather straightforward using data from the 
criticality assessment (European Commission, 2017). This is not however the case for the other steps of the 
supply chain. Often, big companies own production facilities and sales offices in multiple countries for which 
the supply shares are not normally known. This makes it very challenging and often impossible to collect 
pertinent data specifically for processed materials and components and sometimes for the final product 
(assembly). Therefore, a simplified approach of using headquarters location to assess country supply shares 
was adopted. Such an approach, however, could introduce some form of discrepancy into the calculation of 
the final supply chain shares, since they can differ from the supply shares calculated using the geographical 
location where actual production takes place. The possible discrepancy introduced due to this approach was 
assessed for battery technology where data are available for the last two steps — components and Li-ion cell 
production. Figure 49 shows country supply shares calculated using the headquarters approach and the 
geographical location of the production facility. Figure 50 illustrates the comparison between final supply-
chain shares for Li-ion components and Li-ion cells using both approaches. With the exception of Europe 
regarding Li-ion cell production, where a large discrepancy is observed, the deviation for the other countries is 
estimated to be between – 50 % and + 44 %. 
Conclusion 
In spite of this deviation, the fact that China is the major supplier in the supply chain in both cases is evident. 
The shares of other suppliers also show relatively small differences. It is assumed that similar conclusions 
can be also drawn for the other technologies in the study. 
Figure 49. Comparison between country supply shares based on headquarters and on the geographical location of 
production facilities for Li-ion components (cathodes, anodes, electrolytes and separators) and Li-ion cells 
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Figure 50. Overall country supply chain shares for Li-ion components and Li-ion cells: comparison between (a) 
headquarters location and (b) geographical location of production facilities 
 
(a) 
 
 
 (b) 
 
Data used in the analysis 
Public open sources such as Statista, USGS, Europages, European Commission reports, etc. were used for the 
analysis to the greatest possible extent. Market/consultancy reports, commercial (companies’) websites, 
associations’ reports and websites were also used. 
Data on raw materials were taken from the 2017 CRM (European Commission, 2017) study on critical raw 
materials. 
Data on processed materials, components and assemblies (e.g. batteries, fuel cells, robots) were taken from 
various sources. Shares were calculated preferably using production data/capacity or market/sales data 
whenever possible. Otherwise, data on revenues were used. If no other data were available, the number of 
companies per country was used to estimate country shares. 
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As a rule, the location of a company’s headquarters was taken into account in order to allocate a company to 
a specific country. If a company with its headquarters in Europe has production facilities in other non-
European countries, for instance, it still counts as a European company in the analysis and vice versa. 
The following countries are considered to be ‘Europe’ in the report: the EU-28, Belarus, Norway, Switzerland 
and Ukraine. Cross-continental countries such as Russia and Turkey are not considered to be ‘Europe’ in this 
study. 
The data used for supply chain analysis for all investigated technologies are summarised in the related JRC 
technical background report EUR 29889 EN (MatDual, 2019). 
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HT-PEMFC high-temperature polymer electrolyte membrane fuel cell 
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